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1 Introduction and summary
The Brain Waves project
Developments in neuroscience, the study 
of the brain and nervous system, are 
likely to provide signifi cant benefi ts for 
society. Increasing understanding of the 
brain and advances in technologies to 
study it will enable improved treatment of 
neurodegenerative diseases, such as 
Parkinson’s and Alzheimer’s, and mental 
illnesses, including depression and 
schizophrenia. They will increase our 
insights into normal human behaviour 
and mental wellbeing, as well as enabling 
other enhancement, manipulation, and 
even degradation of brain function and 
cognition.
Neuroscience and neurotechnology 
reach far and wide into disparate fi elds. 
The array of ‘neuro’ disciplines lend 
themselves to applications in diverse areas 
of public policy such as health, education, 
law, and security. More broadly, progress 
in neuroscience is going to raise questions 
about personality, identity, responsibility, 
and liberty, as well as associated social 
and ethical issues. The aim of the Royal 
Society’s Brain Waves project is to explore 
what neuroscience can offer, what are its 
limitations, and what are the potential 
benefi ts and the risks posed by particular 
applications.
This report is the fi rst in a series of four 
‘modules’. Three subsequent modules 
will consider specifi c policy issues in 
more detail:
Module 1: Neuroscience, society and • 
policy;
Module 2: Neuroscience: implications • 
for education and lifelong learning;
Module 3: Neuroscience, confl ict and • 
security;
Module 4: Neuroscience, responsibility • 
and the law.
Summary
This Module 1 report is a collection of 
essays that together provide a primer of 
current developments in neuroscience and 
highlight interesting issues and questions 
for society and policy. It is not intended as 
an exhaustive review of the science, nor to 
make specifi c policy recommendations. 
Rather, it raises key issues and questions, 
many of which will be explored in more 
depth in subsequent modules.
In Section 2 of the report we review the 
state of development of neuroscience 
and neurotechnology, discuss the 
translation of this knowledge into useful 
applications or inferences, and raise some 
of the implications. Section 2.1 explores 
neuroimaging. Here, we describe some 
of the existing tools used to study the 
brain, their limitations, and associated 
issues for healthcare, business, 
criminal justice, and privacy. In Section 2.2 
we address developments in neuropsy-
chopharmacology, their application for 
mental health medicines, wider issues of 
recreational use, as well as emerging 
applications for cognitive enhancement.
Neural interfaces and brain interference 
are the subject of Section 2.3, which 
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reviews those providing direct input to 
the brain to modulate activity and those 
that use outputs of brain activity to 
control external devices or prostheses. 
Applications in diverse areas of health-
care and the games industry are dis-
cussed. Sections 2.4 and 2.5 address 
what new developments in neuroscience 
may mean for our understanding of 
behaviour and decision-making. Section 
2.4 argues that understanding of con-
scious and unconscious decision-making 
processes presents a challenge to our 
concepts of responsibility and free will. 
Section 2.5 explores how recent work in 
behavioural neuroscience is leading to 
insights about the neurobiological basis 
of economic decision-making.
In Section 3 we examine some of the 
opportunities and risks these scientifi c 
developments present, as well as the 
ethical questions they raise, and 
governance issues that need to be 
considered. Section 3.1 describes some 
of the benefi ts and opportunities in 
neuroscience, with a particular focus on 
new drugs to combat mental illness and 
cognitive decline, and the associated role 
of the private sector. Section 3.2 explores 
some of the potential risks of certain 
applications, such as the risks of 
‘medicalising’ behaviour with pharm-
aceutical interventions, the potential 
dangers to human rights and privacy 
posed by invasive applications of 
neuroimaging, and the potential hazards 
to international security presented by 
the militarisation of neuroscience.
The burgeoning fi eld of neuroethics is the 
subject of Section 3.3, which probes 
issues such as personal identity, physical 
and moral enhancement, responsibility, 
and artifi cial intelligence. Finally, in Section 
3.4 we draw lessons from the wider 
governance of science and technology, 
suggesting approaches to marshalling 
neuroscience in order to maximise the 
benefi ts and minimise any risks.
Professor Colin Blakemore FRS, Chair, 
Steering Group, Brain Waves project
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2 Contemporary neuroscience 
and technology
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2.1  The scope and limits 
of neuroimaging
Professor Geraint Rees, University College London
Background
The term ‘neuroimaging’ refers to a group 
of technologies that allow some aspect of 
human brain structure or function to be 
measured without having to perform 
surgery. These technologies all measure 
the activity or structure of large 
populations of brain cells (neurons), in 
contrast with invasive techniques used in 
animals that measure the activity of 
individual neurons. Human neuroimaging 
instead measures aggregate signals from 
hundreds of thousands of neurons. 
However, unlike more invasive techniques, 
human neuroimaging acquires these 
signals from many tens of thousands of 
locations throughout the entire brain 
simultaneously. The techniques described 
below differ in their spatial resolution—
how well they can distinguish between 
two points close together, affecting how 
‘sharp’ the image is. They also vary in 
temporal resolution—the precision of the 
image with respect to time. There is often 
a trade-off between the two; however a 
combination of techniques can be used.
Neuroimaging techniques
Structural MRI
Structural neuroimaging acquires 
measurements of brain anatomy non-
invasively. The surface of the brain (cortex) 
is a convoluted structure of folds and 
ridges visible to the naked eye. These are 
made up of a thin layer of gray matter 
(where neuronal cell bodies are found) 
underpinned by extensive white matter (or 
‘wiring’). Within the brain, subcortical 
nuclei of gray matter contain further 
neuronal cell bodies.
Computed tomography (CT) is a technique 
that uses x-rays to visualise brain anatomy 
in sections. It is deployed in hospitals 
throughout the developed world for 
immediate assessment of stroke and after 
head injury, due to its ability to detect 
rapidly bleeding within the skull or bone 
injury respectively. For research (and 
increasingly many clinical) purposes, it has 
largely been supplanted by magnetic 
resonance imaging (MRI).
The advantage of MRI is that the different 
components of brain structure, such as 
subcortical structures, white matter and 
gray matter, can be given different 
contrasts so that the detailed anatomical 
structure of the brain can be visualised. 
The typical spatial resolution of such 
structural images is between 0.5 and 
1 mm3, which represents anatomical 
groups of several hundred thousand 
neurons.
In the white matter of the brain, the 
diffusion of water is limited by the cell 
membranes of long, conducting neurons. 
Diffusion–weighted MRI measures the rate 
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and direction in which water molecules 
diffuse within the brain, and so can allow 
visualisation of the white matter. By 
applying mathematical ‘tracking’ 
algorithms to these images, the structure 
and direction of neuronal tracts that 
connect different brain regions can be 
visualised.
Functional MRI
Functional MRI (fMRI) refers to the use of 
MRI scanning to detect some aspect of 
brain function (rather than simply 
structure) (see Figure 1 and Figure 2). 
The most widely used type of functional 
MRI is known as Blood Oxygenation Level 
Dependent (BOLD) imaging. This measures 
Figure 1 This is a MRI image of the visual cortex in one hemisphere of the brain. (The 
visual cortex is the part of the brain that is active when you look at something.) The dark 
grey stripes represent gray matter at the bottom of sulci and the light grey stripes 
represent gray matter associated with brain gyri. Overlaid on the infl ated anatomical 
image are colored patches representing functional MRI signals associated with stimulating 
different regions of the visual fi eld. (Reproduced courtesy of Geraint Rees, University 
College London.)
V3A
V3B V3d
V2d
V1d
*
V1v
V2v
V3v
V4
V1d
V1v
V2d
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changes in the level of oxygenation in 
the blood, which changes locally in the 
brain as neurons become active and 
consume oxygen. This leads to 
compensatory changes in blood fl ow to 
the active area that can be detected. BOLD 
contrast fMRI is therefore an indirect 
measure of neural activity, through the 
effects of changes in local blood fl ow in 
the brain. Because blood fl ow is regulated 
on a spatial scale of a few millimetres, this 
limits the spatial resolution of this 
technique; and because blood fl ow 
changes relatively slowly over a few 
seconds, this limits the ability of the 
technique to discriminate very rapid 
changes in neural activity associated with 
perception, thought and action.
Nevertheless, BOLD contrast fMRI has a 
number of advantages over previous ways 
of imaging brain function such as Positron 
Emission Tomography (PET) (described 
later), because it is entirely non-invasive 
and has much higher spatial resolution. 
Typically BOLD contrast fMRI is combined 
with rapid acquisition of brain imaging 
data. This enables the researcher to 
acquire a continuous series of images of 
the brain, one every few seconds over a 
period of 30 or 40 minutes, while the 
participant performs a particular task. This 
allows for inferences about the nature of 
the brain processes and their localisation 
during the task on the basis of the 
patterns of brain activity that are 
measured.
Figure 2 The visual cortex is highlighted in this brain image created using functional 
magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI). The surface of the brain has been expanded so the 
parts that are normally hidden away down the folds are ‘blown out’ and are shown as darker 
areas. (Reproduced courtesy of Mark Lythgoe and Chloe Hutton, University College London.)
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Functional MRI can also measure other 
aspects of brain function, such as blood 
fl ow, and it might also be possible in future 
to use MRI to detect the electrical currents 
associated with neurons directly.
EEG and MEG
Although not always considered ‘imaging’ 
techniques, electroencephalography (EEG) 
and magnetoencephalography (MEG) share 
the ability of other technologies to produce 
a moment-by-moment topographic ‘map’ 
of human brain activity. In contrast to the 
other technologies, EEG and MEG measure 
the tiny electrical currents or associated 
magnetic fi elds, respectively, that are 
associated with the summed activity of 
many hundreds of thousands of neurons in 
the human brain. These techniques 
measure such activity through hundreds of 
electrodes/sensors on the scalp and can 
produce an image of brain activity 
associated with thought processes. They 
provide a measure of brain activity that 
directly refl ects the electrical activity of 
neurons in the brain (albeit large groups of 
such neurons) in contrast to the indirect 
measure of signals related to blood fl ow 
measured by fMRI and PET.
The principal advantage of such a measure 
is that it can track the activity of neurons 
much more rapidly over a timescale of a 
few milliseconds. EEG and MEG therefore 
have superior temporal resolution to other 
techniques. However their ability to resolve 
activity in specifi c brain areas is more 
limited, both because it is diffi cult to 
measure electrical or magnetic signals 
from areas deep within the brain (such as 
the thalamus) and because of the intrinsic 
mathematical uncertainty associated with 
the process of reconstructing how activity 
in specifi c brain areas gives rise to 
electrical signals in the scalp. For these 
reasons EEG/MEG are often used together 
with functional MRI as complementary 
approaches; one with temporal but less 
spatial resolution, the other with greater 
spatial but less temporal resolution.
Other functional neuroimaging 
techniques
Other neuroimaging technologies are less 
widespread but fi ll important niches by 
providing unique capabilities.
Positron emission tomography (PET) 
requires the injection of a radioactive 
tracer molecule. Detectors placed around 
the head or other body part being imaged 
can sense the radioactive decay of the 
tracer molecule in the body. This allows 
the reconstruction of images of the brain 
or other organs where the image is 
sensitive to the particular molecule used. 
Oxygen-15 labelled water can provide 
images of cerebral blood fl ow, similar to 
functional MRI, which has now largely 
supplanted PET for providing dynamic 
images of brain activation. When the 
radiotracers are molecules that bind to 
receptors or other sites of drug action 
then PET can be used to image the 
concentration, or changes in 
concentration, of neurotransmitters (the 
chemical messengers in the brain) at 
receptors. This is a particular feature of 
PET not shared with other neuroimaging 
techniques, and may be particularly 
important in understanding psychiatric 
diseases.
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Near infrared spectroscopy (NIRS) is a 
method that measures the absorption of 
light at near infra-red wavelengths. In brain 
imaging, the resultant spectrum can be 
related to the concentration of oxygenated 
and deoxygenated haemoglobin in blood. 
This approach can be used non-invasively 
by applying a near infra-red source and 
array of detectors to the intact skull, which 
is not entirely opaque to infra-red light, 
particularly in babies and infants who have 
relatively thin skulls. NIRS can thus be 
used as a non-invasive neuroimaging 
technique measuring brain activation in 
babies and infants. In comparison to the 
other techniques, NIRS is portable and can 
be used at the bedside for medical 
applications. However it has relatively low 
spatial resolution due to the diffi culty in 
localising scattered light through the intact 
skull, and the limited penetration of 
infrared light into the cortex.
In addition to these approaches, there are 
a number of other techniques such as 
single photon emission computed 
tomography (SPECT) that is lower in spatial 
resolution than PET and largely used as a 
clinical technique and not in neuroscientifi c 
research. (This essay has not discussed 
invasive optical imaging approaches used 
to image exposed brain tissue in animals 
such as 2-photon imaging.)
Uses of neuroimaging
Neuroimaging provides measurements of 
brain structure and activity associated with 
relatively large populations of neurons 
throughout the brain. It has been used to 
determine how and where in the human 
brain such measurements are correlated 
with perception, thought and action. Often 
this is achieved through intermediate 
psychological or computational theories 
that make predictions about how particular 
brain structures give rise to observed 
behaviour. These can then be tested by 
seeking evidence for signals from those 
brain structures consistent with theoretical 
predictions.
The ultimate goal of this work is to arrive at 
an account of how mental processes are 
manifested in the human brain, and how 
this gives rise to observable behaviour in 
terms of speech and motor actions or other 
behaviours. This approach has also been 
applied widely to studying disorders of the 
brain, whether caused during development 
or in adult life, and associated with 
neurological or psychiatric disease.
Studying brain disorders
The major use (by volume and cost) of 
neuroimaging technologies is in 
healthcare. This is principally to provide 
diagnostic imaging for use in clinical 
decision-making. In the last twenty years, 
neuroimaging technologies have become 
widely available in the developed world 
and this has been driven by healthcare. 
For example, in Europe from 1999 to 
2009, the number of MRI scanners 
increased from an average of 0.54 to 1.38 
per 100,000 people (European 
Community Health Indicators). Most of 
these scanners are in health care facilities 
and not all are capable of the advanced 
neuroimaging data acquisition and 
analysis discussed here. However, MRI 
scanning is now readily available at 
reasonable cost (typically around £500 
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per hour) both inside and outside research 
institutions.
The widespread dissemination and use 
of neuroimaging technologies coupled 
with the invention of functional MRI in 
the early 1990s, which permitted easy 
and non-invasive measurement of brain 
function, has led to an explosion in 
scientifi c studies of cognitive processes 
in the normal and abnormal brain. In 
this domain, perhaps the widest use of 
brain imaging technologies are to 
identify the processes through which 
information in the brain is manipulated to 
drive human cognition. Signifi cant 
progress has been made in 
understanding the neural basis of 
cognitive processes such as attention and 
memory. Work in healthy volunteers 
(explored below in more detail) is 
complemented by large numbers of 
studies describing how such processes 
break down in abnormal development 
(eg autism) or following brain damage 
(eg stroke or Alzheimer’s disease). These 
areas of research have generated 
thousands of research papers.
Studying the normal human brain
By understanding the relationship between 
brain signals and either sensory processing 
(the interpretation of stimuli), thought, or 
intention to make an action, functional 
brain imaging techniques hold out the 
prospect that they might be able to provide 
a non-invasive ‘read out’ of perception, 
thought and intention respectively. At 
present, determining the thoughts and 
intended actions of others requires them 
to voluntarily speak to us or make an 
action. This leads to signifi cant problems 
when such abilities are impaired through 
neurological damage, so an ability to non-
invasively ‘read out’ such intentions or 
perceptions would have potential 
importance (see also Section 2.3).
Recent advances in neuroimaging data 
analysis have enabled a limited type of 
‘brain reading’ or non-invasive detection of 
particular perceptions, thoughts, or 
intentions to make an action. To date, all 
these applications of neuroimaging are 
restricted to decoding thought or action in 
quite limited experimental settings, where 
only a small number of possible thoughts or 
actions are entertained. Moreover, they 
generally rely on analyses performed some 
minutes or hours after the data have been 
collected. In the future, developments might 
mean that collection and analysis of fMRI 
data can take place in real time. This would 
raise the possibility of being able to decode 
an individual’s thought and intended action, 
without requiring the participant to speak or 
move, in near real-time (see also Section 
2.3). Nevertheless, there are important 
limitations to these potential applications 
that may be insurmountable, as discussed 
below.
Humans are particularly skilled at judging 
the mental states of others, and this forms 
the basis of much social interaction. While 
there are approaches to detecting an 
individual’s current perception or 
behaviour, humans are also skilled at 
concealing their mental states through their 
behaviour. For millennia there has been 
interest in detecting such concealed 
information. One type of concealment 
occurs during deception, and a large 
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number of bodily markers of deception 
have been proposed including the 
physiological signs that form the basis of 
polygraph tests.
More recently, there has been substantial 
interest in using neuroimaging to detect 
deception (see also Sections 3.2, 3.3, and 
Box 1). Much work has focused on the 
neural mechanisms that underpin lying 
versus truth telling. These show that a 
particular area of the brain (the prefrontal 
cortices) is particularly involved in 
inhibiting truthful responses and 
generating the false responses 
characteristic of lying. Local brain activity 
or patterns of brain activity can also 
distinguish truth-telling from lying on a 
trial-by-trial basis for individual cases. But 
there are signifi cant limitations to these 
approaches, including the use of 
countermeasures (covert or overt 
measures taken by the subject in order to 
distort or undermine any conclusions) and 
the inability to generalise from studies of 
groups of individuals to single individuals.
Lying typically requires a deliberate 
conscious effort. A different approach to 
detecting deception focuses on 
unconscious processing and/or recognition 
of specifi c knowledge about an event. The 
so-called Guilty Knowledge Test utilises a 
series of multiple-choice questions, each 
having one relevant alternative (eg some 
aspects of a crime under investigation) and 
several neutral alternatives, all chosen to 
be indistinguishable by an innocent 
participant. If the subject’s physiological 
(or brain imaging) responses to the 
relevant alternative are consistently greater 
than for the neutral alternatives, then 
knowledge of the event is inferred.
These uses of neuroimaging share two 
common conceptual themes. Either they 
are attempting to identify the presence of a 
particular cognitive operation (eg lying) or 
they are attempting to detect particular 
mental contents (eg having previously 
seen a particular object). Thus while these 
approaches have been examined in the 
context of detecting deception, they have 
many other potential applications. For 
example, there has been widespread 
interest in detecting mental contents as a 
tool to potentially communicate with 
seriously brain-injured individuals. Thus the 
ethical and policy implications of working 
in one area have to be understood in the 
context of other potential uses of the 
technology.
Limits of neuroimaging
Generic limits
It is worth noting that all neuroimaging 
techniques require participants who can 
(and want to) comply with the procedures 
and instructions entailed. The most 
important technical limitation of human 
neuroimaging is that all currently available 
techniques are constrained to 
measurements of aggregate signals from 
hundreds of thousands of neurons at a 
time. Thus any signals critical for 
perception, thought or actions that are 
encoded at a fi ner spatial scale may be 
hard to detect using neuroimaging.
The techniques outlined above differ in 
their relative strengths and weaknesses. 
Functional MRI relies on measurement of 
signals associated with the oxygenation 
level of haemoglobin in the blood. This 
changes at a relatively fi ne spatial scale 
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and so the spatial resolution of functional 
MRI is of the order of a few millimetres. 
But its temporal resolution is relatively 
poor, because blood fl ow changes that 
alter oxygenated haemoglobin 
concentration lag several seconds behind 
the electrical activity of neurons. In 
contrast, the electrical techniques of MEG 
and EEG have millisecond temporal 
resolution because they measure the 
electrical signals associated with neuronal 
activity directly at the scalp. However, 
because these signals summate over 
space and are altered by the scalp and 
tissues, the spatial resolution of these 
techniques is relatively poor compared to 
fMRI. Thus neuroimaging techniques are 
complementary in their limitations, which 
often leads to their use together to 
investigate a particular scientifi c problem.
The principal disadvantage of PET is the 
need for extensive radiochemistry 
infrastructure (both people and equipment) 
to develop new radiotracers. Existing 
radiotracers can often be made on site 
with relatively small needs for additional 
equipment. Nevertheless the technique 
remains comparatively expensive and 
infl exible compared to all other 
neuroimaging techniques. The temporal 
resolution of PET is extremely low; typically 
one image is acquired every thirty seconds 
or so. Moreover, the need to use ionising 
radiation places exposure limits on the 
numbers of scans that can be acquired 
(typically a maximum of 12, compared to 
no limits on fMRI where typically hundreds 
or thousands of scans are acquired for 
each participant).
All neuroimaging techniques measure 
brain activity that can only be correlated 
with subjective reports or observable 
behaviour of the individual being scanned. 
Such correlations do not imply a causal 
relationship between the brain activity and 
behaviour. For example, if two or more 
brain regions show activity patterns that 
are correlated with a particular behaviour, 
it may be that one or more of those areas 
are not necessary to generate the 
behaviour and could be damaged by 
illness without affecting performance. To 
identify a causal relationship therefore 
requires that neuroimaging data is 
combined with other evidence, such as 
that obtained through studying individuals 
with brain damage or transiently disrupting 
brain function through transcranial 
magnetic stimulation (TMS) (see Section 
2.3 and Box 4).
There are also barriers to the use of 
currently available neuroimaging in real-
world environments. All the technologies 
discussed here are widely available in 
hospital and research environments in the 
developed world, but there are signifi cant 
obstacles to more widespread deployment 
in the community. MRI technologies 
require a large, heavy fi xed installation that 
can only be transported in a large 
articulated truck. Scanning participants 
with MRI requires that they lie supine in 
an enclosed space, limiting access and 
interaction with the external environment, 
although a number of ingenious 
experimental approaches have been 
devised to circumvent this. Similarly MEG 
requires a cumbersome installation that 
requires careful electrical shielding. EEG is 
the most portable technology and can in 
principle be used in the home setting. 
However, local interference from other 
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electrical devices is not trivial and can 
signifi cantly limit performance. Moreover, 
the electrodes that are applied to the scalp 
for EEG cannot be worn for extended 
periods or in most real-life situations. 
Emerging technological developments 
may circumvent this possibility with the 
creation of easily wearable and 
unobtrusive electrodes, but this at present 
remains a future development.
In addition to these generic limitations of 
the technologies, particular methods have 
specifi c limitations that have already been 
discussed above. Specifi c issues relating 
to the application of neuroimaging 
technologies are described below.
Specifi c issues
While neuroimaging techniques have 
proven impressive in their ability to provide 
new insights into how mental processes 
are realised in the human brain, these 
insights are typically provided by studying 
relatively large groups of individuals. While 
they can provide insights into the group 
average (or typically, representative) 
patterns of brain activity, they can provide 
less insight into the variability of these 
patterns of brain activity associated with 
an individual. The ability of these fi ndings 
to guide therapeutic decisions or inform 
policy about individuals is thus typically 
limited. This is not an intrinsic limitation, 
but refl ects a relative dearth of studies 
concerning inter-individual variability.
The use of functional neuroimaging 
technologies to decode specifi c instances 
of what a subject is thinking at a precise 
moment has been impressive. But these 
studies, attempting to understand specifi c 
conscious content in an individual and 
operate as a ‘brain reading’ device, suffer 
from a potential limitation of 
generalisation. Because the number of 
potential thoughts or perceptions an 
individual can have at any one time is 
virtually limitless, a general-purpose brain 
reading device would need to be able to 
generalise not just over all the thoughts an 
individual had previously experienced, but 
also any possible or indeed conceivable 
future experiences. Moreover, 
experimentally the process of ‘brain 
reading’ is typically studied in isolation, 
whereas in everyday life people typically 
have two or more streams of thought 
concurrently. It is not clear whether ‘brain 
reading’ techniques would be able to cope 
with such concurrency of thought.
Thus, irrespective of the possible policy 
issues that arise through recent 
developments in our ability to ‘brain read’, 
potentially serious and possibly 
insurmountable empirical limitations are 
already apparent.
The potential ability of neuroimaging to 
uncover covert mental states has received 
much recent attention. In fact, this has 
always been an area of intense interest to 
policymakers. The polygraph is a well-
known approach to detecting deception (a 
covert mental state). Although not a 
neuroimaging technique, it has been 
repeatedly evaluated and its validity and 
reliability have been challenged for 
decades in systematic reviews and 
evaluations. In addition to questions about 
its reliability and validity, the polygraph is 
particularly vulnerable to 
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countermeasures. Such vulnerability to 
countermeasures is shared by all 
neuroimaging efforts to date that attempt 
to detect deception through measuring 
brain activity directly.
Moreover, it remains unclear whether 
any neuroimaging technique is in fact 
superior to the poor performance of the 
polygraph, as there have been no direct 
comparisons. One of the important 
limitations of any such evaluation is 
that techniques for detecting 
deception are typically developed and 
validated in populations of young 
individuals simulating deception. It is 
not clear whether such simulated 
deception corresponds in any way to 
deception carried out in the real world. 
Moreover it is not clear whether any 
indices of deception (whether brain 
based or otherwise) detected in young 
healthy adults generalise in any way to 
older individuals or groups with mental 
illness – to name but two groups over-
represented in prison populations. These 
issues limit both the validity and the 
potential use of neuroimaging 
technologies in detecting deception (see 
also Box 1).
Policy questions and issues
Healthcare
The widespread availability and use of 
clinical neuroimaging, coupled with the 
computerisation of health service imaging 
platforms, means that there are now very 
large numbers of (principally structural) 
brain images collected within the National 
Health Service. These are mainly used 
for diagnostic purposes and clinical care, 
but represent a potential resource 
unparalleled in scope and scale for the 
large-scale study and characterisation of 
illness. At the same time, large scientifi c 
projects such as UK Biobank that tracks 
biomedical indicators and their relation to 
the health of a very large sector of the UK 
population are beginning to consider 
adding neuroimaging measures. An 
important emerging policy area is the 
structure and organisation of such 
collections of tens or hundreds of 
thousands of images, including who 
controls access to such resources, the role 
of patient consent, and the ethical issues 
surrounding their potential use to identify 
predisposition to disease, or to reveal 
information about groups of individuals 
perhaps only loosely connected to the 
initial reason for their undergoing clinical 
neuroimaging.
Many of the important applications of 
neuroimaging assess some form of brain 
plasticity (changes in connections among 
different parts of the brain) either in 
response to injury (such as stoke) or 
imbalance in the chemical messenger 
systems of the brain (neurotransmitters). 
This raises the possibility of developing 
assays of functional reorganisation and 
plasticity to diagnose neuropsychiatric 
syndromes, fi nd associations with genetic 
predispositions, and help predict likely 
outcomes for patients and their carers.
Business
The role of neural processes in determining 
economic decisions has been a subject of 
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intense research interest worldwide in 
recent years. This has led to commercial 
interest in ‘neuromarketing’ and the 
possibility that neuroimaging measures 
of brain activity might help in the design 
or marketing of commercial products, or 
perhaps be used as a more effective 
way to evaluate marketing efforts 
than simply asking people (see 
Section 2.5).
Security and criminal justice
There has been a great deal of interest in 
understanding whether an ability to 
detect covert mental states or deception 
might be useful in security and criminal 
justice arenas. Despite considerable 
limitations to currently available 
techniques described above, there is 
often an unspoken assumption that these 
can be overcome by technical 
development. From a neuroscientifi c point 
of view, this is an empirical question and 
one whose answer is by no means 
certain. This uncertainty and current 
limitations have not stopped consideration 
of the use of neuroimaging techniques to 
assess the credibility of a witness or 
suspect, assess an offender’s criminal 
liability and responsibility, and more 
recently to attempt to prognosticate on 
the dangerousness of an offender or their 
likelihood to reoffend (Zeki and 
Goodenough (eds) 2004). These issues 
are also discussed in other essays (see 
Sections 3.2 and 3.3) and will be 
addressed in Module 4 of the Brain Waves 
project on neuroscience, responsibility 
and the law.
Mental Privacy
Underpinning many of the policy areas 
described above is the concept of mental 
privacy, discussed further in other 
essays (see Sections 3.2 and 3.3). Our 
mental contents are typically not 
directly observable and individuals can 
choose whether and to what extent 
to reveal their mental states through 
communication. But the advent of non-
invasive imaging technologies that 
might, in principle, permit the decoding of 
mental states raises the possibility 
of detecting mental states without 
requiring direct communication from 
the individual (provided the participant is 
able and willing to co-operate). Moreover, 
the possibility that functional or structural 
images encode additional information 
about an individual or their behavioural 
dispositions raises the possibility that 
such images acquired for other incidental 
reasons might be reanalysed after 
acquisition to reveal this ‘hidden’ 
information.
Conclusion
There has been a rapid development in 
both the deployment and the capability of 
neuroimaging techniques in the last 
twenty years, particularly with the advent 
of non-invasive functional imaging 
approaches. Nevertheless, despite some 
spectacular advances in our understanding 
of the neural basis of mental processes, 
the practical limitations of both the 
techniques and their use in ‘real world’ 
situations limits their potential use outside 
clinical and research arenas.
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Box 1: Neuroimaging and lie detection
Professor Geraint Rees, University College London
Neuroimaging technologies (see Section 2.1) for lie detection show some promise in 
being able to explore the neural correlates of deception (a covert mental state), but 
none currently has anywhere near suffi cient sensitivity, specifi city and reliability to be 
deployable in the criminal justice system of England and Wales. Indeed, it remains 
uncertain whether such technologies will ever be suffi ciently robust to be used in such 
‘real world’ settings. Nevertheless, despite the technological barriers there remains 
considerable interest and pressure to consider the use of such technologies, and great 
public interest in situations worldwide where neuroimaging evidence has been used 
as evidence in criminal cases.
The polygraph is a well-known approach to detecting deception. Although not a 
neuroimaging technique—it relies on the measurement of skin conductance, which 
can be infl uenced by arousal during deception—it has been repeatedly evaluated and 
its validity and reliability have been challenged for decades in systematic reviews and 
evaluations. In addition to questions about its reliability and validity, the polygraph is 
particularly vulnerable to countermeasures—covert or overt measures taken by the 
subject of the polygraph in order to distort or undermine any conclusions.
Such vulnerability to countermeasures is shared by all neuroimaging efforts to date 
that attempt to detect deception through measuring brain activity directly. Moreover, it 
remains unclear whether any neuroimaging technique is in fact superior to the poor 
performance of the polygraph, as there have been no direct comparisons. One of the 
important limitations of any such evaluation is that techniques for detecting deception 
are typically developed and validated in populations of young individuals simulating 
deception. It is not clear whether such simulated deception corresponds in any way to 
deception carried out in the real world. Moreover it is not clear whether any indices of 
deception (whether brain-based or otherwise) detected in young healthy adults 
generalise in any way to groups over-represented in prison populations, such as older 
individuals and those with mental illness. These issues limit both the validity and the 
potential use of neuroimaging technologies in detecting deception.
These issues will be addressed in more detail as part of Module 4 of the Brain Waves 
project on neuroscience, responsibility and the law.
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Background
The fi eld of neuropsychopharmacology 
encompasses drugs that affect cognition, 
behaviour, and the brain. The brain itself 
comprises multiple networks, each of 
billions of nerve cells (‘neurons’), which 
interact via the release of chemical signals, 
termed ‘neurotransmitters’, that diffuse 
from one nerve cell to the other across the 
gaps between them (synapses).
By binding to specialised proteins in the 
cell membrane called receptors, 
neurotransmitters change the sensitivity of 
the nerve cell membranes to potential 
inputs from other cells. Receptors function 
in two main ways: i) through short term 
effects induced by neurotransmitter 
binding that allows the passage of ions 
into and out of the cell, which rapidly 
change its function or ii) through longer 
term changes induced by a biochemical 
cascade inside the nerve cell which 
eventually interacts with genetic material 
in the cell nucleus.
Although originally it was considered that 
each nerve cell released only one 
neurotransmitter and that there were two 
main chemical transmitters (one excitatory 
and the other inhibitory) these concepts 
have been overturned in the last three 
decades by the realization that there are 
literally dozens of neurotransmitters, and 
that most neurons can release more than 
one type, thus enabling a very precise and 
sophisticated modulation of the activity of 
the receiving nerve cells. A simple 
classifi cation of the main neurotransmitters 
subdivides them according to the speed 
and nature of their effects on neuronal 
circuits.
Fast signaling neurotransmitters which link 
large interconnected neural networks 
constitute mainly the amino acids 
glutamate and GABA (gamma-
aminobutryic acid), and slow modulatory 
neurotransmitters, whose action is neither 
exclusively excitatory nor inhibitory include 
the monoamines; dopamine, noradrenaline 
and serotonin (or 5-hydroxytryptamine, 
5-HT). Finally, very slow modes of action 
are generally characteristic of neuropeptide 
neurotransmitters such as cholecystokinin 
and vasopressin, which may be co-
released with the ‘classical‘ 
neurotransmitters, thus modifying their 
effects (see Stahl 2008).
New developments in 
neuropsychopharmacology
Neuropsychopharmacology has focused 
mainly on understanding the molecular 
basis of action of drugs that alter the 
activity of the chemical neurotransmitter 
systems by one or more mechanisms. 
Drugs may be classifi ed as ‘agonists’ that 
simulate the action or evoke the release of 
natural neurotransmitters at specifi c 
receptors, or ‘antagonists’ that block the 
actions or the re-uptake of natural 
neurotransmitters at specifi c receptors. We 
now understand a good deal about entire 
2.2 Neuropsychopharmacology
Professor Trevor Robbins FRS, University of Cambridge
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pharmacological classes of drugs that 
share common mechanisms of action to 
exert effects in the brain.
Recent important developments are brain 
imaging techniques (see Section 2.1) that 
have enabled researchers to link the 
molecular actions of drugs to specifi c 
behavioural or physiological effects in 
humans. Positron emission tomography 
(PET) can be used to map the location of 
neurotransmitter receptors in the brain and 
can be utilised in conjunction with 
pharmacological treatments to infer the 
activity of central neurotransmitter systems 
in the human brain. This technique has 
been used, for example, to show that drug 
addicts have reduced dopamine receptors 
in the striatum area of the brain (Volkow 
et al. 1997), thus confi rming leads from 
animal work that the dopamine system is 
implicated in addiction.
The use of functional magnetic resonance 
imaging (fMRI) has been important for 
establishing ‘event related’ correlations 
between brain activity and behaviour over 
time. Pharmacological fMRI is a recent 
development which enables the analysis of 
drug effects on cognition and behaviour—
however, it has two main diffi culties: fi rst 
its lack of neurochemical specifi city in 
relation to PET and secondly the possibility 
of misleading responses arising from drug 
actions on cardiovascular factors.
Another major area of development is 
pharmacogenomics (Royal Society 2005). 
The human genome project has enabled 
the identifi cation of gene variants that defi ne 
individual variation in genetic make-up. Such 
genetic polymorphisms not only allow 
differences in cognition and behaviour to 
be related to them, but also drug effects. 
Indeed, given the molecular specifi city of 
drug action, such mapping may be done 
more effectively than for individual 
variability in behaviour itself.
Prominent examples include 
demonstrations that the cognitive 
enhancing effects of amphetamine may 
depend on a polymorphism in the brain 
that regulates the activity of dopamine in 
the prefrontal cortex of the brain; thus 
either benefi t or impairment may occur in 
response to the same dose of the drug in 
different individuals (eg Mattay et al. 
2003). A second example is the fi nding 
that depression produced by the drug 
ecstasy is also highly variable in users and 
can be related to variability in 
mechanisms controlling the activity of 
serotonin in the brain. Genetic differences 
may also modulate the capacity of 
cannabis to trigger psychosis. Such 
observations have enormous implications 
for calculating the risk associated with 
drug-taking and for predicting benefi ts of 
drugs in the treatment of mental illness 
(‘personalised medicine’), as well as for 
‘cognitive enhancement’ in healthy 
individuals.
Varied drug effects in the brain
In functional terms, it makes sense to 
subdivide the main drug actions into those 
which bring about detrimental or 
incapacitating effects by impeding or 
damaging neural activity, and those which 
bring functional effects by modulating 
neural activity. The latter effects may be 
produced by drugs: i) used as mental 
health medicines, such as anti-psychotic or 
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anti-depressant medications; ii) used for 
their cognitive or performance enhancing 
effects (eg including sexual performance 
or for effects on personality); and iii) used 
recreationally or abused, leading to 
addiction.
Some of these categorisations are 
signifi cant; for example, several so-called 
cognitive enhancing drugs do not produce 
subjective effects that usually accompany 
recreational use, and also do not lead to 
obvious physical dependence. 
Nevertheless, there is a good deal of 
overlap among these categories; for 
example, some abused drugs such as 
methamphetamine undoubtedly have 
neurotoxic effects, while a drug producing 
cognitive enhancing effects could also be 
‘abused’ (eg both in terms of criminal use 
such as cheating in competitive 
examinations, and in terms of a 
psychological dependence, leading to 
excessive drug intake). Moreover, virtually 
all drugs of abuse, from opiates to 
stimulants, have been used at one time or 
another in a medical context. Stimulants 
were formerly used as slimming agents; 
they are still used in the treatment of 
attention defi cit hyperactivity disorder 
(ADHD). Heroin was originally employed in 
cough mixtures, and opiate drugs are still 
employed as powerful pain-killing 
(analgesic) agents. Nicotine may have 
cognitive enhancing effects and variants of 
nicotine are being pursued as possible 
cognitive enhancing agents. Cannabis has 
been suggested to be benefi cial in the 
treatment of multiple sclerosis. Some of 
this plurality of action arises from the fact 
that many drugs have multiple sites of 
action in the brain, even though the same 
receptor may be implicated (eg euphoric 
and analgesic effects of opiates).
In terms of basic neuroscience research it 
is relevant to note that each of these drug 
sub-divisions can also be used to discover 
more about brain function.
Mental health medicines
Mental health medicines are continuously 
being monitored, with controversies often 
arising about effi cacy and safety of drugs, 
for example certain anti-depressants. 
Patents for many compounds are due to 
expire soon and there has been a worrying 
failure to produce many more effective 
drugs that utilise new mechanisms of 
action, although there are some possible 
exceptions (eg ketamine for depression 
and drugs affecting glutamate 
transmission for schizophrenia). This has 
led several of the major pharmaceutical 
companies to close down programmes in 
psychiatry and neuroscience, which could 
result in considerable harm to both health 
and the economy in the UK and other 
countries (see also Section 3.1). On the 
other hand, the relative success of drugs 
used to treat positive symptoms in 
schizophrenia and severe clinical 
depression means that companies will 
continue to make large profi ts from the 
sale of mental health medicines.
One major diffi culty may be increasing 
regulatory controls on drug development 
accompanied by a shift to risk aversion on 
the part of the drug companies in the face 
of adverse side effects. Another may be 
that the expensive clinical Phase 3 trials 
can be scientifi cally suspect due to poorly 
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controlled factors. Relatively minor 
advances have come in the form of more 
sophisticated means of drug delivery, 
which minimise the number of 
administrations involved in medicating 
certain patient groups, for example 
formulations for ADHD that require only 
once daily dosing.
Recreational drugs
Use and abuse: Many different classes of 
drug are used to produce subjective 
effects (such as changes in mood, 
including euphoria or sedation) in the 
recreational context. Some of these drugs 
are legal (eg alcohol, nicotine) but most are 
not (eg stimulants such as cocaine and 
methamphetamine, opiates such as heroin, 
and hallucinogens such as cannabis and 
ecstasy (MDMA)). Distinct molecular 
actions of these different drugs have been 
to a large extent identifi ed. However, 
similar neurobehavioural principles may 
govern how they might become drugs of 
abuse. For example, many of these drugs 
have some common effects on brain 
dopamine systems, which may be 
responsible for some of their reinforcing 
(‘rewarding’) actions.
We now have a considerable 
understanding of the basis in the brain of 
the effects of recreational drugs, both 
through studies with experimental animals 
(who may self-administer them) and 
neuroimaging studies of drug-using 
humans (Robbins et al. 2010). Some of the 
drugs (eg alcohol, heroin) have obvious 
physical withdrawal syndromes which are 
associated with drug dependence. These 
drugs may also produce psychological 
dysphoric (opposite of euphoric) 
withdrawal states, which are also 
postulated to occur following stimulant 
withdrawal. However, the tendency 
towards compulsive drug seeking and 
‘out-of-control’ drug taking, which are the 
hallmarks of addiction, is not an inevitable 
consequence of drug use; there 
is considerable individual variation in the 
degree to which individuals are vulnerable 
to addictive properties of drugs, probably 
arising from both genetic and 
environmental infl uences. It has for 
example, been estimated that only about 
20% of persistent cocaine users actually 
become addicted or ‘dependent’ on 
cocaine.
Addiction and dependence: Addiction has 
been the subject of several recent major 
reviews, notably the wide-ranging, 
interdisciplinary Foresight project Brain 
science, addiction and drugs (published as 
Drugs and the Future, Nutt et al. 2006) and 
the subsequent Academy of Medical 
Sciences (2008) report of the same name. 
Several key issues were raised by these 
reports including: i) the relative absence of 
effective medications for addiction; ii) the 
absence of reliable and informative 
epidemiological data concerning addiction 
in the UK; iii) the lack of accurate 
information about adverse effects and risks 
entailed by using certain drugs, such as 
ecstasy and cannabis, which has led to 
controversies about how such drugs 
should be classifi ed under the Misuse of 
Drugs Act by the Home Offi ce, and 
considerable confusion arising from a 
failure to appreciate the importance of 
individual differences in susceptibility to 
drug effects; and iv) the likelihood of novel 
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drugs of abuse emerging periodically. 
These may be previously known 
compounds for which new properties are 
discovered, or new compounds claimed to 
offer ‘legal highs’ (eg mephedrone) which 
are not controlled and are available to buy 
on the web. Many ‘new’ drugs are often 
variations on a theme in terms of chemical 
structure, for example, being derivatives of 
the amphetamine-class of stimulant drugs.
Cognitive enhancers
Considerable interest was aroused in 
cognitive enhancers and performance 
enhancing drugs (see also Box 1; and 
Sections 3.1, 3.2, and 3.3) by the Foresight 
project. This project made it clear that 
there may exist certain drugs with the 
potential ability to enhance cognitive 
performance, not only in patients with 
cognitive disorders, but also in the normal 
healthy population (Jones et al. 2007; 
Academy of Medical Sciences 2008).
‘Cognition’ refers to brain processes of 
mental activity including: perception, 
attention, learning, memory, language, 
thinking, planning, decision-making and 
cognitive control. Cognition must be 
distinguished from overt behaviour, which 
is, however, largely a product of cognitive 
processes. Cognitive performance also 
depends on other important factors such 
as arousal level (ie the level of wakefulness) 
and motivation. Thus, in theory a ‘cognitive 
enhancer’ may produce its benefi cial 
effects indirectly through effects on 
motivation or arousal. (This essay excludes 
consideration of enhancement of other 
aspects of behaviour such as sexual 
function or appetite.)
A major impetus for the emergence of 
cognitive performance enhancers has been 
the focus by pharmaceutical companies on 
the treatment of cognitive disorders such as 
dementia (including Alzheimer’s and 
Parkinson’s disease), and more recently 
stroke, schizophrenia and ADHD. 
Economic arguments underpinning this 
interest are compelling, given the estimated 
market for dementia therapy (see Jones 
et al. 2007). Such disorders are associated 
with different forms of pathology and so it 
is likely that there will be a need for different 
types of medication. However, it is also 
conceivable that a single compound may 
have several possible disease targets, as it 
may provide improvements not by 
removing a particular pathology but by 
producing compensatory improvements in 
neuronal systems that are intact.
There is no programme in ‘big Pharma’ for 
developing cognitive enhancers for the 
healthy population; regulatory and legal 
issues determine this lack of commercial 
interest. However, ‘cognitive enhancing’ 
drugs may be publicised by word of 
mouth, the media and the web, often 
leading to considerable ‘off-label’ use, 
which raises signifi cant issues of 
regulation for government. A commentary 
in Nature by Sahakian and Morein-Zamir 
(2007) entitled Professor’s Little Helper 
described the ‘off-label’ use of cognitive 
enhancing drugs such as methylphenidate 
(Ritalin) and modafi nil by University 
students and academics. Many of their 
conclusions were endorsed by a 
subsequent questionnaire issued by the 
same journal (Maher 2008).
A compelling consideration for ‘cognitive 
enhancers’ is the diversity of candidate 
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mechanisms that are being utilised in 
their development. Many compounds, 
including well-known drugs such as 
methylphenidate (Ritalin) (see Figure 3), 
amphetamine, and nicotine exert their 
effects by optimising chemical signalling 
by monoamine neurotransmitters (eg 
dopamine, noradrenaline, or 5-HT) in brain 
regions such as the prefrontal cortex. New 
compounds, such as the ‘AMPA-kines’ 
work by exaggerating the effect of the fast 
signalling neurotransmitter glutamate in 
neural networks in key ‘cognitive’ 
structures of the brain such as the cerebral 
cortex and the hippocampus.
Drugs are also being developed as ‘inverse 
agonists’ that invert the sedative actions of 
related compounds to produce memory-
enhancing effects. One such compound 
has been found to block the amnesia 
produced by alcohol, through acting at 
GABA-activated receptors. Another, 
modafi nil, has long been licensed as a 
treatment for narcolepsy, but has also been 
shown to enhance working memory and 
Figure 3 These images show the signal acquired using [18F]fallypride (the radioactive 
tracer molecule) positron emission tomography following placebo (top row) and oral 
methylphenidate (Ritalin) (bottom row) in a healthy volunteer, superimposed on a high 
resolution magnetic resonance image (MRI) acquired from the same volunteer. [18F]
fallypride competes with endogenous (naturally produced) dopamine for the binding to 
dopamine receptors. The signal reduction observed following methylphenidate relative to 
placebo indicates that the drug increased dopamine levels, leading to less  [18F]fallypride 
binding due to increased competition with endogenous dopamine. (Reproduced courtesy of 
Natalia del Campo, University of Cambridge.)
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executive functioning in non-sleep-
deprived volunteers. Intriguingly, it is far 
from clear how it produces its cognitive 
enhancing effects and this is a currently a 
subject of great research interest.
‘Nutraceuticals’ such as vitamins, 
supplements and other aspects of dietary 
modifi cation may also produce cognitive 
effects, although their precise modes of 
action are largely obscure. Perhaps 
predictably, members of the public appear 
to fi nd cognitive enhancement via dietary 
means less objectionable than by orally 
administered drugs, even though they may 
share common modes of action.
The discovery of cognitive enhancing drug 
effects is of particular interest in terms of 
boosting performance in a number of 
different occupations—notably in shift 
workers, for which controlled trials are 
already suggesting some benefi t. Another 
potential application has been illustrated in 
a demonstration of benefi cial effects of 
modafi nil in the performance of surgeons, 
over conventionally-employed stimulants 
such as caffeine, which lead to 
counterproductive hand tremor (Sugden 
et al. 2010).
This area is also of signifi cance for 
subsequent modules of the Brain Waves 
project. There is signifi cant military interest 
in cognitive enhancement. Modafi nil is 
thought to have been used by the French 
army in Iraq in the early 1990s and in 2003 
the US Air Force authorised its use to 
combat fatigue. This use of modafi nil 
echoes that of stimulants such as 
amphetamine in the Second World War, 
but today there is much more precise 
information about the benefi ts—and the 
costs—of such practice (see also 
Section 3.2).
Some aspects of the ‘cognitive 
enhancement’ strategy arising from recent 
discoveries in basic neuroscience may 
appear paradoxical at fi rst sight. For 
example, it may eventually be possible to 
help patients with certain disorders such 
as post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD), 
anxiety, or drug addiction by treating them 
with drugs that seemingly impair 
cognition—by producing selective 
amnesias. It is now evident from work on 
experimental animals that memories may 
be subject to experimentally-induced 
forgetting if evoked in the presence of 
certain drugs (so-called ‘memory 
reconsolidation’). This is also true for the 
procedure of extinction, whereby a certain 
stimulus is no longer followed by its 
expected consequence, a process that 
leads to an active suppression of the 
normally-evoked behaviour. Extinction can 
be accelerated in the presence of drugs 
that facilitate the functioning of certain 
receptors.
The optimization of behaviour by 
pharmacological agents is a complex issue 
that depends on a balance of cognitive 
enhancement and cognitive suppression. 
It is now crucial that we begin to assess 
possible costs as well as benefi ts as a 
consequence of treatment with cognitive 
enhancers, especially long term or chronic 
consequences. Relevant considerations 
have been set out in the Academy of  
Medical Sciences (2008) report on Brain 
science, addiction and drugs.
Allied to this scientifi c excitement and 
uncertainty are similar ethical dilemmas 
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posed by the use of cognitive enhancing 
drugs by the healthy population. Whilst it 
may not be considered ethically dubious to 
aspire to enhance performance, there are 
obvious problems in competitive 
situations, eg examinations or the 
workplace. Other ethical issues may 
include the coercive use of such drugs, 
such as to ensure good behaviour in 
juveniles with ADHD (eg in certain schools 
in the US), or as a compulsory requirement 
for soldiers. The example of cognitive 
enhancers is a main theme of the 
burgeoning new subject of ‘neuroethics’ 
(see Greely et al. 2008) (see Section 3.3).
Incapacitating agents
Drugs acting on the central nervous 
system can also be used to incapacitate 
humans, primarily for benefi cial purposes, 
such as the use of anaesthetics under 
highly controlled circumstances for 
medical procedures, or the sedation of 
violent patients. However these drugs have 
also drawn the attention of military and 
police organisations since the late 1940′s 
for use as chemical weapons. Developers 
of such incapacitating chemical agents 
generally aim to target the central nervous 
system to induce unconsciousness or 
sedation. These weapons are distinct from 
‘riot control agents’, such as ‘tear gas’, 
which cause local irritation to eyes, skin, 
and the respiratory tract, and have long 
been used by police forces around the 
world.
Since the international ban on chemical 
weapons was agreed in 1993 some 
countries have continued to develop 
incapacitating chemical weapons—ie 
drugs targeting the brain (as opposed to 
‘riot control agents’)—for law enforcement 
purposes. This has led to signifi cant 
controversy and concern, particularly 
following the use of an aerosolised spray 
of an opioid analgesic drug, thought to be 
3-methylfentanyl (carfentanil), to break the 
siege of a Moscow theatre in 2002, which 
resulted in the death of over 120 hostages 
(see also Section 3.2). This issue will be 
addressed in more detail as part of Module 
3 of the Brain Waves project.
As in the case of cognitive enhancing 
drugs, there are many ways of producing 
incapacitating effects including 
mechanisms related to anaesthesia and 
respiratory depression, as well as more 
general neurotoxicological actions. The 
former can be produced via a range of 
different mechanisms generated by our 
burgeoning understanding of brain 
mechanisms of consciousness, including 
the discovery of new neurotransmitter 
substances such as orexin. (Saper et al. 
2005).
Conclusion
The fact that drugs can produce mind-
altering effects through their chemical 
actions has been known for centuries, but 
the excitement of the fi eld in neuroscience 
is that we can now explain a good many of 
these actions through our enhanced 
understanding of the chemistry and 
functioning of the brain. A signifi cant 
realisation is that drugs can have diverse 
effects on different aspects of function 
(leading obviously to inevitable ‘side-
effects’); and that these effects will often 
encompass both benefi cial (eg ‘cognitive 
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enhancing’, ‘mood-enhancing’, pain-killing 
and detrimental (physical withdrawal, 
neurotoxicity) actions. Thus, it becomes 
important to defi ne in which precise 
context a drug is being used, and also to 
formulate the cost-benefi t equations in 
both biological and ethical terms. (see also 
Sections 3.2 and 3.3).
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Box 2: Cognitive enhancing drugs
Professor Trevor Robbins FRS, University of Cambridge
‘Cognitive enhancers’ are a broad class of drugs from a number of distinct 
pharmacological classes with diverse molecular mechanisms of action (see Table 1). 
These may include disease modifying drugs (for example, arresting aspects of 
Alzheimer’s disease pathology) or compounds that exert specifi c effects on particular 
chemical neurotransmitter systems. These serve to optimise different aspects of 
cognitive function, often mediated by different parts of the brain. There is growing 
published evidence that such actions may range, depending on the compound, from 
the enhancement of working memory (eg for recalling telephone numbers) or episodic 
memory (eg for memories of one’s own life) to the augmentation of concentration and 
the restraint of impulsive urges. These functions may be impaired in many 
neuropsychiatric patient groups, including those with schizophrenia, attention defi cit 
hyperactivity disorder (ADHD), addiction, brain damage, or Parkinson’s disease, and 
are all targets for pharmacological remediation.
Cognitive functioning is powerfully modulated by such factors as motivation and 
arousal. For example, it is frequently sub-optimal even in healthy individuals as a 
function of circadian infl uences, fatigue or sleep deprivation. Thus any agent affecting 
those processes is bound also to also impact on cognition—often benefi cially, 
although excesses of either motivation or arousal are likely to impair cognition. There 
are also probable costs as well as benefi ts of effects of cognitive enhancers because 
of the theoretical diffi culty of optimizing, simultaneously, all of the brain systems that 
contribute to cognition. Thus what may be good for consolidating long term memory 
is possibly incompatible with improvements in short term memory. It is also possible 
that long term use of cognitive enhancers may lead to a reduction of any benefi cial 
effect, for example, because of the phenomenon of drug tolerance, or because of the 
possibility of neurotoxic effects of such compounds. However, these factors have not 
been researched extensively.
Another complicating factor is that, as for many other drug effects, there is 
considerable individual variability in response and some individuals may benefi t from a 
dose of a compound that impairs cognitive function in others. Such variability is already 
known to depend in part on individual genetic variation and this may enhance future 
programmes directed towards personalised medicine and risk assessment. The issue of 
cognitive enhancement in healthy individuals has gained considerable prominence on 
the basis of recent surveys; whilst many so-called cognitive enhancers cannot be 
obtained by prescription, they are often available via the internet. This raises regulatory 
issues, to accompany the ethical controversy that exists on the non-medical—‘off-
label’—use of cognitive enhancers (see also Sections 2.2, 3.1, 3.2, and 3.3).
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Table 1: Candidate cognitive enhancing drugs
Mechanism of action Examples
‘Nootropic’ agents (probably acting 
through effects on cerebral metabolism)
piracetam, aniracetam, nefi racetam, 
oxiracetam, pramiracetam, pipexide
Glutamatergic agents (some under clinical 
trial)
ampakines, memantine, D-cyclo-
serine, mGLU-R5 potentiators, glyt-1 
inhibitors
GABAergic (γ-aminobutyric acid) agents inverse GABA receptor agonists eg 
suritozole; GABA-b receptor 
antagonists eg NS105
Catecholaminergic agents methylphenidate (Ritalin), atomoxetine, 
propanolol, bromocriptine, L-Dopa
Cholinergic agents nicotine and related nicotinic agonists 
(alpha-7; alpha4, beta 2) galantamine, 
rivastigmine, donepezil, choline, 
lecithin
Histamine R3 antagonists ABT-39,ciproxifan
‘Eugeroics’ or atypical stimulants: 
unknown mechanism, possibly via 
adrenergic or hypocretin receptors, 
dopamine reuptake blockade, 
histaminergic or glutamatergic 
mechanisms
Modafi nil
Agents acting on cerebral circulation or 
calcium homeostasis
vinpocetine, hydergine, phenytoin, 
nifedipine, nimodipine, Idebenone.
Hormones and neurohormones dehydroepiandrosterone (DHEA) and 
DHEA-sulphate, vasopressin
Miscellaneous others acetyl-L-carnitine, gingko biloba, 
ginseng, orotic acid, vitamin E, vitamin 
B6
Brain Waves Module 1  I  January 2011  I 29The Royal Society
30  I  January 2011  I  Brain Waves Module 1 The Royal Society
2.3  Neural interfaces and brain 
interference
Professor Irene Tracey, University of Oxford
Background
A new branch of neuroscience has evolved 
over the past decade that is causing 
considerable excitement. Aimed at 
creating links between the human nervous 
system and the outside world by 
stimulating or recording from neural tissue, 
it is hoped to bring unprecedented benefi t 
for people with sensory, motor or other 
disabilities of brain function. Devices that 
may enable restorations of these functions 
are known as brain-machine interfaces 
(BMIs), brain-computer interfaces (BCIs), 
neural prostheses or neural interface 
systems (NISs). For simplicity, here the 
overarching term, NIS, will be used.
NISs can be broadly separated into two 
types—interfaces that input to neural 
systems, and NISs that record electrical 
activity (output) and use it to predict 
cognitive intentions. ‘Input NISs’ constitute 
the majority of NISs to date and have 
already reached widespread clinical 
application. They provide direct electrical 
stimulation input to a specifi c part of the 
nervous system to restore or improve 
function by altering local neural activity 
(see Box 3).
‘Output NISs’ are another matter and it is 
these devices that are causing such a stir 
in the scientifi c and clinical communities, 
as well as among the general public. 
Output NISs record electrical signals from 
the brain and this ongoing neural activity is 
decoded and used to predict cognitive 
intentions (eg plans to perform a 
movement). In this way they can 
potentially replace a lost connection to the 
outside world. Also, by forming a direct 
connection between the brain and outside 
world, NISs free us from the limitations of 
our bodies. It is this last opportunity that 
has captured the public’s imagination.
Devices that can decipher intentions, which 
to date are generally movement related, are 
being developed into clinically viable 
systems for patients who are paralysed. As 
is often the case with advances made in 
the medical arena, we are simultaneously 
seeing these developments penetrate the 
games and toy industries too. Such 
translation brings knowledge, acceptance 
and normalisation of this extraordinary 
concept within society.
Other techniques, sometimes known as 
‘brain interference’ devices, and which 
include Transcranial Magnetic Stimulation 
(TMS) and Transcranial Direct Current 
Stimulation (tDCS), are now widely used in 
neuroscience research with some clinical 
applications (see Box 4). These devices do 
not encode or decode brain signals but 
instead inhibit or excite brain activity to 
produce certain behavioural outcomes. 
They are limited in the specifi city regarding 
which brain region can be stimulated and 
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are relatively crude when compared to the 
precision of NISs. However, they are useful 
devices for allowing ‘non-invasive’, 
controlled manipulation of cortical brain 
regions and as such, they contribute to a 
more causal understanding of human brain 
networks, particularly when combined 
with other brain imaging tools such as 
functional magnetic resonance imaging 
(fMRI) and electroencephalography (EEG) 
(see Section 2.1).
NIS research is a thriving area of 
neuroscience that links animal and human 
neurophysiology research and brings new 
insight into the neural basis of behaviour and 
perception. Advancement in NIS technology 
heralds new ways for understanding brain 
function and our understanding of neural 
coding and representation, plasticity, brain-
behaviour relationships, as well as the 
neurobiology of disease. But what about 
extending these NISs to other forms of brain 
manipulation—aimed at cognitive 
enhancement or neural ‘modifi cation’ or 
‘correction’? As these technologies improve, 
we are faced with the realisation that a new 
era has begun in neuroscience and with it 
important issues are raised that warrant 
discussion (see Sections 3.2 and 3.3).
Early studies that provided the 
impetus for NIS developments
In the 1960s and early 1970s pioneering 
experiments from awake, behaving 
nonhuman primates showed that the 
activity of neurons within a specifi c brain 
area (the primary motor cortex) was 
directly correlated to specifi c aspects of 
movement. More importantly, these 
movements could be predicted by the 
neural activity within this area. These 
animals demonstrated that they could 
wilfully control the activity in their motor 
cortex to alter the movement of an 
independent device. This provided the fi rst 
evidence that primates could learn 
feedback control of neural activity without 
actually performing any bodily movements. 
These early observations provided the 
impetus for the following thirty years of 
research to develop viable NISs for 
humans (Evarts 1968; Fetz 1969; 
Humphrey et al. 1970).
The current state of the science
Two forms of neural interface are possible:
i) Open-loop prediction which records 
neural activity from multiple sites to 
predict behaviour. Open–loop paradigms 
enable us to learn what features of 
neural activity are critical for eliciting the 
measured behavioural outcome. We can 
then record and then decode these.
ii) Closed-loop control, which records 
neural activity to guide a device 
controlled by an animal/human that 
receives sensory feedback for learning 
purposes. Here, the experimental 
subject can use feedback (eg watching 
where the external device is moving) to 
modulate neuronal activity on an 
ongoing basis, so that the accuracy of 
the intended outcome (eg the 
movement of the device) can be 
improved. In essence, the NIS here 
effectively acts as a virtual mirror to 
real neuronal activities.
Closed-loop control is the common 
approach used in clinical applications, as 
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these largely focus on paralysed patients 
who require control of an artifi cial limb or 
device via intention, and where feedback 
to improve performance is critical. Patients 
suffering spinal cord injury, stroke, 
degenerative disorders and amputation all 
retain a brain mechanism to generate 
movement intentions. All they need is a 
way to deliver motor commands from the 
brain to an artifi cial aid or directly to still 
functioning muscles (called Functional 
Electrical Stimulation).
Many examples have recently been 
published, often using non-human 
primates (Truccolo et al. 2010; Velliste et al. 
2008; Kipke et al. 2008). Here, recordings 
are taken and decoded from many areas of 
the cortex, and used for prediction of 
movement or control of an external robot 
or device.
Proof-of-concept studies in rats and non-
human primates paved the way for 
determining the essential elements for a 
successful closed-loop NIS. This has now 
been translated to early stage human 
clinical trials with considerable success, 
and is generating much media and public 
interest (Hatsopoulos and Donoghue 2009; 
Hochberg 2006). To enable a patient with 
severe paralysis to regain control, 
communication and independence would 
be a tremendous achievement. 
Considering the number of conditions 
where a disconnection between a healthy 
brain and target muscles produces 
paralysis but where the patient has a 
normal capacity for planning and 
imagining movement, this is the fi rst 
obvious target area of application. Patients 
suffering spinal cord injury, stroke, 
degenerative disorders and amputation all 
retain a brain mechanism to generate 
movement intentions. All they need is a 
way to deliver motor commands from the 
brain to an artifi cial aid.
Potential clinical applications
A pilot study of the fi rst human long term 
implanted multielectrode array-based NIS, 
called BrainGate, is ongoing and so far 
deemed successful (Hochberg 2006). The 
NIS records signals from an implant within 
the part of the motor cortex responsible for 
the arm in patients with severe paralysis, 
following injury. They are now able to 
move a cursor on a screen and perform 
grip and transport actions using a robot’s 
arm. What is astonishing about these 
results is that years after injury-induced 
paralysis, normal brain activity was still 
present in the motor cortex that could be 
wilfully modulated.
Functional imaging studies in humans 
show that imagined movement produces 
blood-fl ow-related changes similar to those 
produced during real movement, but it 
was assumed that the nature of the 
underlying neuronal activity might be 
subtly different and not viable for NIS. 
From this pilot NIS study, it is apparent 
that the underpinning brain patterns 
observed are similar whether movement is 
imagined or performed.
Animal studies show that the brain rapidly 
changes following injury (often in a 
maladaptive way) due to plastic 
mechanisms, affecting activity in primary 
cortical areas. However, recordings in 
various chronically injured patients now 
challenge this view. Clearly, years after 
sustaining dramatic injuries the neural 
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activity is present and capable of being 
harnessed to operate artifi cial devices. 
Such fi ndings are encouraging but perhaps 
surprising and raise questions about how 
closely fi ndings in animals are applicable 
to humans. These results also encourage 
us to reconsider attitudes towards patients 
who are severely disabled but have brains 
perfectly capable of encoding behaviour.
A decoder must simultaneously collect 
information on both neural activity and 
behaviour in order to map one to the other. 
This is not possible in patients who have 
already lost the behavioural component 
(eg movement). However, passive visual 
observation of a task produces neuronal 
responses near identical to those observed 
when the task is performed. This 
knowledge provides us with the concept of 
‘mirror-neurons’ (neurons that behave the 
same when a task is observed as when 
that task is performed) that can be used in 
the development of NISs bespoke to 
patients while contributing to a better 
understanding of the role of such mirror-
like neurons in humans.
As NIS technologies improve, broader 
applications will become available. For 
example, better software in the NIS can 
generate smoother movements of external 
devices, as well as allowing more motor 
control and movement options, which 
might suit severely disabled individuals. 
One context where this ability is potentially 
applicable is for patients in vegetative 
states and comas. There has been a lot of 
recent publicity surrounding data from 
neuroimaging studies showing that 
patients who are in a persistent vegetative 
state may have wilfully controlled thoughts 
(Owen et al. 2006). The media coverage 
surrounding these fi ndings indicates that 
the public wants to engage and debate the 
implications of this work (Cruse and Owen 
2010).
Brain-Body Uncoupling
One potentially very interesting 
extrapolation of NISs in the future is in 
‘brain-body uncoupling’. As described 
above, output NISs work because the 
same group of neurons which normally 
move a limb can instead be co-opted to 
move an artifi cial device. Fascinatingly, in 
non-human primates it has been observed 
that these neurons quickly adapt such that 
no or minimal movement of their own 
limbs occur when moving the device in the 
same manner. The capacity of the brain to 
disconnect from its body parts and interact 
with the world via artifi cial means has 
wide-ranging and signifi cant implications.
NISs as tools for neuroscience 
research
NISs have a considerable future role in 
many areas of basic neuroscience 
research. NIS and other neuroimaging 
studies have taught us that large networks 
of neurons beyond specialised motor 
regions are involved in even the simplest 
of movements, as many brain areas can 
encode movement to some extent. These 
fi ndings argue against focussing solely on 
functionally specialised brain regions in 
order to understand systems behaviour.
Further, NISs offer an opportunity to 
understand how the activity of individual 
neurons and the surrounding groups of 
brain cells (measured through fi eld 
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potentials) inter-relate in coding 
information. These two types of electrical 
signals are often studied separately—but 
NISs take in both types of information.
The closed-loop NIS provides an 
unprecedented opportunity to explore 
learning in the human brain in the context 
of short-term and long-term improvements. 
Because the NIS forms a direct, causal link 
between the recorded brain area and 
behaviour, any behavioural changes can be 
attributed to changes in neural activity from 
the recorded brain area and not 
downstream areas (eg spinal cord, 
muscles)—as these have been removed 
from the system. This is not to say that 
there aren’t changes occurring upstream in 
other brain areas that in turn provide altered 
inputs to the recorded brain area, but this 
can now be studied using distributed NISs.
Recurrent NIS and ‘cognitive 
prostheses’
There is considerable interest in creating a 
recurrent NIS system where neural activity 
is recorded and processed in real-time to 
control electrical stimulation of particular 
areas of the brain or muscles through 
other implanted electrodes. The brain 
could then learn to incorporate this activity 
into normal function. Initial devices were 
developed using a ‘neurochip’ that 
interacts continuously with the brain of a 
monkey, allowing continuous operation 
during free behaviour and sleep. Future 
applications might include using NISs to 
directly control a patient’s paralysed 
muscles (instead of an external device) 
where the normal pathway has been 
damaged.
More interesting and ethically challenging 
applications include those producing 
long-term modifi cation of the strength of 
connections between brain cells. Given that 
the strength of connections between cells 
underpins learning and behaviour, NISs 
could potentially ‘force’ the brain to react in 
a certain way to a certain stimulus or ‘learn’ 
something. However, given our ignorance 
of the way that memory is structured this 
seems a distant possibility.
Technological developments make it 
possible to implement recurrent NISs in 
higher-order cognitive areas of the brain—
eg hippocampus, producing what could be 
called a ‘cognitive prosthesis’. This could 
cause signifi cant changes in how the brain 
operates and functions.
Such recurrent NIS induced plasticity opens 
opportunities for experimentation and 
clinical translation (eg to facilitate recovery 
from stroke), but also manipulation and 
exploitation (see Section 3.2).
Technical challenges and 
opportunities
The primary requirements of an NIS for the 
broad range of neuroscience applications 
are recording and/or stimulating from a 
number of discrete parts of the brain at 
requisite spatial resolutions for specifi c 
periods of time, safety, usability, reliability, 
patient acceptance, and cost. A number of 
electrode technologies are in various 
stages of development with wire bundles 
and arrays being the simplest technology 
and most widespread type of implantable 
electrodes. Microfabricated electrode 
arrays (neural probes) are more complex 
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but can be customised to meet specifi c 
experiment requirements to have a larger 
‘design space’.
Technical developments are thus 
progressing that will allow for more 
complicated NISs to be stably implanted 
that will record robustly and reliably for 
many years from different brain areas at the 
same time. Wireless transmission of 
information is also a real possibility. In 
addition, developments in better 
understanding of ‘background’ brain activity 
may allow for more detailed control of the 
behavioural output. Rather than controlling a 
massless, virtual object or physical device 
via a controller, it is important to develop 
NISs that can control a system that has 
physically realistic dynamics – early results 
for this are promising.
Finally, NISs to date have largely relied upon 
visual feedback. However, incorporating 
other forms of sensory feedback will be 
important, such as tactile and 
proprioceptive (sense of the body’s position 
and movement) sensations. For example, 
an NIS might be able to (artifi cially) 
stimulate muscles directly (via functional 
electronic stimulation) and receive feedback 
from the body’s network of sensors that 
provide proprioception. Or, during 
movement, an NIS could stimulate the 
areas of the brain that elicit tactile and 
proprioceptive experiences in individuals 
where these are lacking.
Less / non-invasive NISs and 
extrapolation to the games and 
toy industry
Non-invasive NISs use brain activity 
recorded from the scalp rather than via 
direct implantation, and support 
reasonably high brain-based control after 
extensive user training. The games and toy 
industries have leapt into this area realising 
how such devices have captured the 
public imagination. Early examples are 
simple games where participants wear a 
headset, focus on a small ball in a cylinder, 
and control the motion of the ball through 
thought. More complex games have 
players move a tiny foam ball through a 
mini–obstacle course using fans that cause 
the balls to rise. Both toys employ EEG (a 
method of measuring brain activity 
through the scalp, see Section 2.1) and 
utilise a wireless headset equipped with 
sensors that read alpha and beta waves, 
relaying signals to the toys.
Using more sophisticated developments in 
neurotechnology, a personal interface for 
human computer interaction has been 
developed by Emotiv. It is described by the 
company as  ‘a high resolution, neuro-signal 
acquisition and processing wireless 
neuroheadset that uses sensors to collect 
data to detect player thoughts, feelings and 
expressions and connects wirelessly to a 
computer’. Emotiv claims: ‘you can use your 
thoughts, feeling, and emotion to 
dynamically create color, music, and art; it 
brings life changing applications for disabled 
patients, such as controlling an electric 
wheelchair, mind-keyboard, or playing a 
hands-free game; you can experience the 
fantasy of controlling and infl uencing the 
virtual environment with your mind’. The 
headset can be linked to software 
applications by converting detected events 
from ‘thoughts’ into any combination of 
keystrokes: For example, smile detection 
can be linked to characters such as ‘:)’, so 
that chat applications know when you smile.
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Less invasive NISs can record from the 
surface of the brain. This requires less 
penetration of the brain than intracortical 
recordings and has a higher spatial 
resolution than scalp based NISs, and 
other benefi ts including potential longer-
term stability than intracortical 
recordings.
Conclusion
NISs exist and are being developed at a 
rapid pace by both the industrial and 
academic sectors with wide-reaching 
application to basic science, clinical 
problems and the games and toy industry. 
Extrapolation to other fi elds, for example 
intelligence and defense agencies, will 
occur in the coming years (see also Section 
3.2). At this point no legislation exists to 
control their use, as in general, devices are 
subject to considerably less stringent 
approval systems than pharmaceuticals. 
Nevertheless, the proven track-record of 
many types of input NISs and early 
indications with the more advanced output 
NISs suggest that potential benefi ts exceed 
the potential for ill-use and harm.
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Box 3: Neural interface systems
Professor Irene Tracey, University of Oxford
‘Input Neural Interface Systems (NIS)’ are now widely utilised in medicine. If we 
consider these input ‘neuroprostheses’ as falling into categories of sensory (eg 
auditory, visual), motor (eg bladder function), pain relieving (eg spinal cord stimulation) 
and cognitive (eg Alzheimer’s), it is clear there is widespread need and potential.
Cochlear implants, auditory brainstem implants and auditory midbrain implants are the 
three main types of auditory prostheses, with the fi rst cochlear implant dating back to 
1957 and being the most successful of all three types. Unlike hearing aids that simply 
amplify sound to send it through the external ear, a cochlear implant has a 
microphone that receives sound from the external environment and sends it to a 
processor that digitises the sound, fi lters it into separate frequency bands and then 
sends these signals to the appropriate region in the cochlear corresponding to these 
frequencies. Estimates from 2006 suggest that over 100,000 are in use worldwide.
Likewise, a visual prosthesis creates a sense of an image by electrically stimulating 
nerve cells in the visual system. A small camera wirelessly transmits to an implant, 
which maps the image across an array of electrodes—stimulating over a thousand 
locations in the retina to create an image.
For pain relief, spinal cord stimulators are used to stimulate sensory cells in the spinal 
cord to produce a tingling sensation in the area of a patient’s, which provides pain 
relief. Again, they are increasingly implanted for intractable chronic pain.
Motor prosthetics are devices that support function of the autonomous nervous 
system, including an implant for bladder control whereby a device delivers intermittent 
stimulation which improves bladder emptying. Directly stimulating muscles (functional 
electrical stimulation) is another means whereby motor prosthetics are used to 
produce movement of a limb in patients with motor disabilities, and of course cardiac 
pacemakers would be another related example. Cognitive prostheses, which are 
discussed in more detail in Section 2.3, aim to restore cognitive function to patients 
with brain tissue loss due to injury, disease, or stroke by performing the function of the 
damaged tissue – this can be via ‘input’ NIS or ‘output’ NIS. An example of a common 
‘input’ NIS in this domain would be deep brain stimulation for alleviation of 
Parkinson’s disease related symptoms.
In short, as these many devices become safer, and our understanding of how the brain 
works increases, our capacity to develop the devices we will see their use increase for 
the betterment of patients’ quality of life and well-being.
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Box 4: Transcranial magnetic stimulation
Professor Geraint Rees, University College London
Transcranial magnetic stimulation (TMS) is a brain stimulation technique that uses 
electromagnetic induction to induce weak electrical currents in the brain using a 
rapidly changing magnetic fi eld. A coil of wire enclosed in plastic is held close to the 
scalp over the brain area to be stimulated. When a current is passed through the coil, 
a magnetic fi eld is produced oriented at right angles to the plane of the coil. 
Magnetic fi elds pass through the scalp and skull and activate nerve cells in the part of 
the brain underlying the coil. The effect of this activation is to transiently disrupt the 
stimulated brain areas, and to produce activity in distant brain areas connected to the 
stimulated areas by neural connections (axons). TMS can both stimulate the 
underlying brain region to produce a muscle twitch and nullify brain activity by 
introducing ‘noise’. The effects of stimulation are temporary and there are no long-
term side effects, though there is a very small risk of inducing an epileptic seizure 
during stimulation. This possibility is minimised through adherence to internationally 
agreed safety guidelines.
TMS belongs to a larger family of non-invasive brain stimulation technologies, 
including transcranial direct current stimulation (tDCS) where weak electrical currents 
are passed through the skull through attached electrodes to modulate the activity of 
neurons in the brain. All of these techniques are commonly used to investigate 
whether activity of neurons in a particular brain area is necessary for a particular 
function. If transient stimulation impairs a particular mental process or function, then 
it can be concluded that the stimulated brain area is causally necessary. TMS can be 
used to investigate the timing of mental processes, by showing that only stimulation 
at one particular time during a process is effective at causing disruption. This ability 
to investigate causality has made it a powerful tool complementary to neuroimaging 
techniques that are purely observational, and so cannot be used on their own to 
determine whether a brain area is necessary for behaviour (see Section 2.1).
This ability to change brain activity raises the question of whether TMS might also be 
capable of deliberately manipulating brain activity and therefore changing thought or 
behaviour (see Section 3.2). However, there are very signifi cant barriers to this that 
have not been overcome. While the fi ctional fi lm Eternal Sunshine of the Spotless Mind 
envisages a future in which a TMS-like device can selectively erase unwanted 
memories, in reality such memories (as with all thoughts, perceptions and actions) are 
encoded in the brain at a very fi ne spatial scale and interwoven with other neuronal 
representations. Because TMS and other techniques necessarily operate at a much 
coarser spatial scale they cannot effect such selective disruption, even if the desired 
pattern of neuronal representations was known. Moreover, the effects of these 
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approaches are transient, lasting a few hundred milliseconds at most, and not 
permanent. Thus, while approaches to ‘brain reading’ show some ability to decode 
individual thoughts, perceptions and actions, there is no commensurate non-invasive 
technique available, either now or in the immediately foreseeable future, that will 
disrupt or change those patterns of activity selectively.
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Background
Progress in brain research allows scientists 
to explore the way that the connections 
between neurones in the brain (the 
‘functional architecture’) guides higher 
brain functions such as perception, 
reasoning, decision-making, planning and 
consciousness. These studies indicate that 
mental functions are based on neuronal 
processes in very much the same way as 
the many other behavioural functions that 
are controlled by the brain. This view is in 
confl ict with our intuitions and requires 
reconsideration of a number of ethical 
issues. This essay provides a determinist 
view of behaviour and decision making that 
is not shared by all (see Section 3.3 and 
Box 5).
Implicit assumptions
In their efforts to understand the 
organisation and function of the brain, 
neuroscientists make a number of 
assumptions that are taken for granted. For 
instance, they consider the nervous system 
to be a specialised organ whose structural 
and functional features depend on genetic 
and other factors in the same way as for 
other organs. The general layout of the 
various centres of the brain and of the 
connections among them is specifi ed by 
genetic instructions. However, to a much 
greater extent than any other organ, the 
properties of the brain can be modifi ed 
according to a person’s experiences. 
During the initial development of the brain, 
which in humans lasts until about the age 
of 20, the wiring of the brain undergoes 
major modifi cations and these depend on 
environmental infl uences. At birth most of 
the neurons are already present and have 
migrated to their fi nal position but many of 
them are not connected yet. Many new 
connections are formed only after birth and 
this outgrowth of connections continues 
until adulthood. These newly formed 
connections are maintained or reduced, 
guided by the activity of neurons, and by 
any external factors that affect neuronal 
activity. Therefore, all interactions with the 
physical and socio-cultural environment 
infl uence the fi nal layout of neuronal 
connections in the brain. These structural 
modifi cations are complemented by 
lifelong learning processes (which are 
discussed further in Module 2 of the Brain 
Waves project, Neuroscience: implications 
for education and lifelong learning). It is 
likely that this is a result of existing 
connections being strengthened or 
weakened depending on use. In this way, 
there is ongoing brain modifi cation after 
the age of 20.
The structure of the mature brain is 
therefore determined by three processes:
i) Genetic instructions that specify the 
general lay out of the brain;
2.4  A determinist view of brain, 
mind and consciousness
Professor Wolf Singer, Max Planck Institute for Brain Research, Frankfurt
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ii) Epigenetic shaping of connections that 
adapts the brain to its environment 
during development;
iii) Lifelong adaptation in response to 
experience.
Neurobiologists assume that all functions 
of the brain are determined by its 
structure and the connections between 
neurons (known as the ‘functional 
architecture’ of the brain). In contrast to 
the situation for computers, in which 
different hardware components are 
reserved for different operations such as 
storage of data and computations, all 
functions of the brain are realised by 
widely distributed networks of neurons 
and uniquely determined by the functional 
architecture of these connections. This 
defi nes the fl ow of signals and the 
structure of the complex activity patterns 
that are the basis of brain functions. 
These include not only basic functions 
such as the ability to perceive, remember, 
and act but also higher functions such as 
the ability to decide, control attention, 
generate emotions and fi nally to 
understand and generate speech, to 
consciously deliberate and to be aware of 
oneself as an independent, autonomous 
and intentional agent. It follows from this 
view that mental phenomena are the 
consequence and not the cause of 
neuronal interactions. A thought or a 
decision is the result of preceding 
computations and therefore cannot per se 
infl uence the functioning of neuronal 
networks. The future dynamics of 
neuronal networks are infl uenced by the 
neuronal activity patterns that underlie the 
thoughts and decisions.
The evidence
Observations suggest that the 
development of complex nervous systems 
is the result of a continuous, self-
organizing process. Throughout 
development, close correlations exist 
between the maturation of distinct brain 
structures and the emergence of particular 
brain functions. The behaviour of simple 
organisms can be fully accounted for by 
the functions of their neuronal networks; 
and the same is likely to be true for more 
complex organisms.
The close relationship between the 
function of brain structures and mental 
phenomena has been demonstrated in 
clinical studies by the loss of specifi c 
functions after structural damage. More 
recently non-invasive imaging technologies 
(see Section 2.1) have provided 
overwhelming evidence that even our 
most ‘private’ thoughts, decisions and 
emotions are preceded by the activation of 
defi ned networks of neurons (Frith and 
Frith 2010; Frith and Rees 2004).
It follows that both subconscious and 
conscious processes are the result of 
neuronal interactions. Our perceptions, 
emotions, decisions, plans, thoughts, 
arguments, and value assignments are 
shaped by sequences of neuronal states 
that are causally linked.
Conscious versus unconscious 
processing
These causally linked brain processes 
determine which of our many mental 
contents actually reach consciousness. 
Evidence indicates that we are aware of 
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only a tiny fraction of the neuronal 
activities that guide and control our 
behaviour. Some signals are always 
excluded from conscious processing, such 
as those involved in controlling blood 
glucose levels and kidney function. The 
same is true for implicit knowledge that 
determines how we perceive, decide and 
react, which we use without being aware 
of the fact that we have it. It is contained in 
the layout of the brain’s functional 
architecture, which in turn is mostly 
determined through genetics and shaped 
during early development without 
conscious control.
In contrast to this implicit knowledge, 
knowledge acquired by learning has 
access to consciousness and can therefore 
be subject to conscious deliberation. 
However, the number of items that can be 
held simultaneously in consciousness is 
limited and it is not possible to retrieve 
them ‘at will’. Everybody is familiar with 
the problem of not being able to recall 
names or situations that have previous 
been well remembered.
Wrong intuitions
The evidence described above contradicts 
our intuition that we can always freely 
decide what we are going to do next and 
which factors we are going to consider 
when we plan future acts. If mental 
processes are the consequence of 
neuronal processes then decisions are the 
result of self-organizing neuronal 
processes that converge towards the most 
probable stable state in the given 
conditions. These conditions usually 
comprise a very large number of variables 
that infl uence neuronal activity. One 
decisive condition is the specifi c functional 
architecture of the brain, which varies from 
individual to individual because of 
differences in genetic dispositions, 
developmental imprinting, and experience. 
The other relevant condition is the 
activation state preceding the moment of 
decision making. Activation patterns that 
have access to consciousness are 
subjectively experienced as causes or 
arguments and can therefore be quoted as 
reasons for a particular decision. We say 
‘we have decided in this way because . . . 
‘and then we give the reasons that we are 
consciously aware of. However, much of 
the activity that actually prepared and 
determined the decision process escapes 
conscious recollection.
Imaging studies indicate that there is 
sometimes a clear dissociation between 
the onset of neuronal activity patterns that 
fi nally result in the decision to move a 
fi nger and the moment when subjects 
become aware of their intention (Moser 
et al. 2010; Soon et al. 2008). After having 
been identifi ed with functional magnetic 
resonance imaging (fMRI) the neuronal 
activation patterns associated with the 
voluntary act to press a key with either the 
right or the left hand, subjects are asked to 
perform freely paced key presses while 
their brain activity is measured. In this case 
the onset of activation patterns predicting 
a right or a left hand press can precede by 
up to ten seconds the subjects’ awareness 
of having decided to press.
In this experiment, the instruction is stored 
in working memory, and the motor act (the 
key press) is prepared before the subjects 
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become aware of what they are going to 
do next. Here, the ‘intention’ is concordant 
with the action. However, there are also 
conditions where the real causes of an 
action dissociate from the reported 
intentions. For instance, subjects can be 
instructed to perform a particular action 
without being aware of having been 
instructed. When subjects that comply 
are asked why they performed the action, 
they reply as if they intended to do so 
(eg ‘I decided to do this because I wanted 
to . . ..’). In this case the reported reasons 
for a particular action do not match the real 
reason, but are experienced as if they had 
been at the origin of the performed action. 
These examples illustrate impressively that 
only a fraction of the neuronal processes 
that prepare decisions and guide behaviour 
have access to conscious recollection and 
that neurobiological processes precede the 
awareness of having reached a decision.
Differences between unconscious 
and conscious decisions
Intuition tells us that there is a difference 
between being able consciously to weigh 
arguments and then decide what to do, 
and acting spontaneously without 
refl ecting consciously different arguments 
and possible consequences. This is not 
necessarily contradicted by what we know 
about subconscious processing as 
described in the section above. The rules 
governing subconscious and conscious 
decisions differ (Engel and Singer 2008; 
Dehaene 2008). The neuronal mechanisms 
underlying decision making are the subject 
of intense research and likely to differ 
depending on the task being done (see 
also Section 2.5). One line of evidence 
suggests that evidence is accumulated 
until a particular threshold is reached, and 
a decision is then made (Shadlen et al. 
2008). This correlates to an increase of 
activity in neural circuits representing the 
different stimuli. The circuit with the 
fastest rise in activity will reach the 
threshold soonest. A different, related 
model suggests that decisions are the 
result of competitive interactions between 
neuronal networks representing different 
options. This model rests primarily on 
behavioural experiments and requires 
further neurobiological examination 
(Keysers et al. 2008 ). It is likely that most 
of these decision processes do not require 
conscious deliberation, or conscious 
recollection of the variables involved).
Conscious decision making appears to 
follow different rules. As consciousness 
has a limited capacity, only a small number 
of variables can be dealt with. This requires 
the contents of declarative memory 
(memory that can be recalled) to be 
scrutinised sequentially, which takes time. 
Moreover, this rational strategy can result 
in well adapted solutions only if the 
variables involved are suffi ciently reliable. 
For most decisions reached in this latter 
way subjects can correctly report the 
relevant arguments.
Decision processes occurring without 
conscious deliberations seem to be less 
constrained. They can exploit the rich 
database of subconscious heuristics 
(problem solving) and therefore can 
process many more variables in parallel 
and cope better with unreliable and ‘noisy’ 
variables. Often, these subconscious 
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processes lead to more adapted responses 
than the conscious deliberations, in 
particular if there is little time for the 
preparation of a decision, if multiple 
interdependent variables have to be 
considered simultaneously and if the 
reliability of these variables is low.
Usually, subconscious decisions result in 
immediate action. However, they may also 
be inhibited by simultaneously occurring 
conscious deliberations. In this case the 
solutions presented by the subconscious 
and conscious decision mechanisms need 
not be congruent. We experience this 
dissociation when we say that we have 
decided after having carefully scrutinised 
all arguments but that the outcome 
somehow does not feel right. Vice versa 
certain decisions are felt to be absolutely 
right even though they are considered 
entirely irrational. Thus, both the 
subconscious and the conscious decision 
mechanisms are equally relevant in 
determining future behaviour. Both are 
based on neuronal processes that 
infl uence in a causal way future states of 
the brain but they follow somewhat 
different rules.
Why is intuition in confl ict with 
neurobiological evidence?
We tend to feel that there is an agent in 
our brain that is at any time free to make a 
decision that overrides that of the 
deterministic neuronal machinery. There 
are at least two reasons for this. First, we 
are only aware of the results of the 
neuronal processes in our brain, and not of 
the mechanisms of these processes. 
Second, we tend to assume that these 
processes are essentially linear. As 
linear processes cannot account for the 
processes that we ascribe to ourselves and 
others, we postulate the existence of an 
intentional agent that is not fully 
determined by the neuronal machinery. 
Linear deterministic systems behave like 
reliable clocks. They cannot self-organise, 
cannot be creative and their future 
behaviour is fully determined by initial 
conditions. Their trajectories can only be 
changed by external forces. In contrast, we 
experience ourselves and others as 
creative, and able to take new courses 
without perceivable external infl uences. 
However, if one accepts that the brain is a 
complex self-organizing system with non-
linear dynamics, an independent 
intentional agent is dispensable. All 
characteristics attributed to such an agent 
are emergent properties of non-linear, self-
organizing systems, such as the brain.
Potential consequences for our 
legal systems
The neurobiological evidence reviewed 
above is incompatible with the view that a 
person, at the moment of having reached 
a decision, could have decided otherwise. 
However, this assumption is said to be at 
the base of our legal systems and the 
justifi cation for attributing responsibility to 
a person and sanctioning deviant 
behaviour. Consequently, it could be 
argued that if this premise is false, persons 
are not responsible for their actions and 
therefore exempt from sanctions. The 
original assumption implies a separation 
between an intentional agent (the person) 
and the mechanics of the nervous system 
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that are required for the execution of the 
agent’s orders. What would be the 
consequences if one abandoned this 
traditional dualist approach and adhered to 
the interpretations suggested to us by 
modern neuroscience? Would this require a 
change of legal practices or only a revision 
of the interpretation of deviant behaviour? 
These issues, and others discussed below, 
will be considered as part of Module 4 of 
the Brain Waves project on neuroscience, 
responsibility and the law.
The view that a person is responsible for 
what she or he does (meaning that they 
are the causal agent) is not invalidated by 
neurobiological evidence, because all 
authorship remains with the deciding and 
acting person. How about the measures 
taken to prevent deviant behaviour or to 
protect society from harm? Should they be 
modifi ed in view of the evidence that the 
delinquent, in the moment of his or her 
action was unable to decide otherwise?
Punishment and confi nement
Punishment is an evidence-based means 
of prevention because of its educative and 
deterrent effect. Constraining freedom is 
likely to remain as a means of protecting 
others. Punishment also seems to fulfi l a 
second function, in satisfying the human 
need for justice. Legal systems do not 
seem to only sanction the amplitude of 
deviance but also the severity of the 
consequences of deviant behaviour. 
Crossing a red light without causing an 
accident may lead to a temporary loss of 
the driver’s license. However, if the 
consequence is a severe accident with 
casualties, the punishment tends to be 
much more severe, even though the 
deviant behaviour, the ‘subjective guilt’, 
was exactly the same.
Attenuating conditions
What light does neurobiological evidence 
shed on the attribution of mitigating 
neurological factors? It is unlikely that this 
would change anything if the purpose is to 
fi nd out how likely it is that anyone else 
would have done the same thing in the 
same circumstances. To determine this, it 
would be necessary to examine the 
options available at the moment of the 
decision, and the extent to which the 
subject was able to fully exploit the brain 
mechanisms required for reaching the 
decision. This comprises evaluation of 
dependencies from external pressure, from 
internal constraints such as addictions or 
compulsory drives, the time available for a 
decision and the ability to rely not only on 
subconscious heuristics but also on 
conscious deliberations. Conscious 
deliberation is attributed particular 
signifi cance because most of the social 
imperatives that have been acquired 
through education are amenable to 
conscious processing.
Viewed from a neurobiological perspective, 
this does not assume anything about ‘free 
will’ because it only examines how far the 
behavioural dispositions or character traits 
of a person exhibiting deviant behaviour 
differ from the normal distribution. If most 
of the human beings raised in a particular 
cultural context would have acted in the 
same way given the conditions, sanctions 
are moderate because attenuating factors 
will prevail. In contrast, if the conclusion is 
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that under the given circumstances the 
deviant behaviour has to be considered as 
extremely far from the norm, sanctions are 
usually drastic.
Brain research posits that behavioural 
dispositions, character traits and the 
decision mechanisms available to a person 
are determined by the functional 
architecture of the person’s brain. Is it then 
that legal systems in practice evaluate the 
extent to which the functional architecture 
of a law breaker’s brain deviates from the 
normal distribution and adjusts sanctions 
accordingly? If this were a commonly 
accepted stance, would it interfere much 
with the common practice of sanctioning 
deviant behaviour or would it only lead to a 
more empathic attitude towards persons 
who happen to end up at the negative tail 
of the normal distribution?
The following simple thought experiment is 
meant to illustrate this point. If a person 
has committed what is considered to be 
cold blooded murder in order to obtain 
some benefi t and a tumour is discovered in 
his frontal lobe, extenuating conditions may 
be granted. One might argue that this 
tumour disrupted the pathways that link 
the storage site of moral values with the 
inhibitory centres that would normally 
prevent the fatal action. From a 
neurobiological point of view, however, one 
might argue that any person capable of 
committing such a crime must always have 
some abnormalities in the functional 
architecture of his or her brain, even if this 
abnormality is not detectable with current 
technologies. Genetic dispositions could 
have limited the storage capacity of the 
networks in which moral values and 
imperatives get stored, or they may have 
led to abnormally weak control 
mechanisms for the inhibition of actions. 
The same abnormalities may have been 
caused by developmental mishaps, 
insuffi cient installation of moral imperatives 
through education, or defi cient inhibitory 
mechanisms due to lack of training during 
brain maturation. If all these features of the 
functional architecture are actually in the 
normal range, then one would have to 
assume temporary abnormalities in the 
system’s dynamics, for instance caused by 
metabolic disturbances, or by some highly 
unlikely but still possible deviations of the 
brain’s dynamics.
Even though none of these abnormalities 
are detectable with currently available 
methods this does not detract from the 
conclusion that there must have been a 
neuronal cause for the deviant behaviour 
whatever its exact nature. Thus, members 
of our society who had the misfortune to 
possess a brain which ended up at the 
negative end of a normal distribution 
should have our empathy. But does this 
exempt our society from its duty to protect 
all its members and to defi ne what is 
tolerable and what is not?
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Box 5: The biological becomes personal: philosophical problems in 
neuroscience
Dr Sarah Chan and Professor John Harris, University of Manchester
Early historical beliefs notwithstanding, we recognise the brain as fundamental to 
shaping who we are, our personality and personal identity. Consider the still-
hypothetical prospect of whole-brain transplantation: most people would probably 
regard this as whole-body transplantation (and not as a brain transplant). Nevertheless, 
and despite modern scientifi c understanding of the brain, the philosophical 
relationship between brain, body, mind and identity remains elusive.
The inherently problematic nature of this can be explored through two related but 
conceptually distinct questions: ‘Am I my mind?’, and ‘Is my mind my brain?’ Clearly, 
‘we’ are not just our brains or our minds: our sense of identity is closely associated 
with our physical bodies; our experience of the world, though expressed in one form 
as brain activity, necessarily includes the phenomenon of embodiment. Equally, 
however, the brain-transplant thought experiment illustrates that selfhood is not solely 
attached to the body. This is refl ected in social and clinical attitudes towards ‘brain 
death’ and current philosophical thinking on ‘personhood’ (Radin 1982; Harris 1985). 
But are we then embodied minds—a mind within a body—or is embodiment itself an 
essential element of mind? Moreover the relationship between the physical and 
mental properties of the human organism is philosophically problematic. Neurobiology 
attempts to explain mental processes and the workings of the mind in terms of 
physical neuronal processes in the brain. But is mind (mental) merely a property of 
brain (physical); can all mental states be reduced to physical phenomena? Against 
such reductionist approaches, we might argue that mental states are not simply 
physical phenomena, any more than a poem is simply words on a page (see also 
Section 2.4).
The mind-body problem has been the subject of extensive philosophical inquiry since 
long before the brain was recognised as the organ responsible for thought. Yet 
although we can now relate states of mind to physical ‘states of brain’, that does not 
resolve the fundamental philosophical questions (Ryle 1969).
Despite the perhaps inextricable entanglement of our physical, mental and 
psychological natures, it is evident that much of what we see as our ‘selfness’ is brain-
dependent. This raises, however, further questions that assume new signifi cance in 
light of neuroscience. For example, am I still the same person when my brain 
changes—through injury or disease, the infl uence of drugs or surgery, or simply 
experiences and the passing of time? Again, we may now be able to observe, 
understand, and even affect the physiological basis of these changes more directly. 
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However, this provides no simple answers to such questions but throws them into 
sharper relief.
The idea that mind and self have biological foundations has profound implications for 
our understanding of free will and responsibility. If all our desires and impulses to act 
can be reduced to neurochemistry, how can ‘we’ be responsible for our actions or 
choices? Studies showing that decisions manifest physically in the brain even before 
one is consciously aware of the decision being made, for example, throw into question 
our usual assumption that it is the conscious mind that exercises free will. And if we 
do not have free will, if our brains are deciding for us, then can we truly be responsible 
for our actions? Responsibility implies volition and intention, not just causation; there 
is a difference between doing something intentionally and unintentionally, yet both 
involve causation and consequences and both have correlated brain states. The origin 
and explanation of free will and of intent, however, remain open to debate (see also 
Section 2.4).
This applies not only to our everyday understanding of moral responsibility but also to 
the concept of legal responsibility. When we hear the defence ‘My brain made me do 
it’, how should we respond? Neuroscience may radically change our concept of 
criminal and legal responsibility, and the way we react to wrongdoing (Greely 2006). 
This topic will be explored in Module 4 of the Brain Waves project on responsibility 
and the law.
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2.5  Reward, decision-making and 
neuroeconomics
Professor Wolfram Schultz FRS, University of Cambridge
Background
Recent work in behavioural neuroscience 
has examined how humans and animals 
make economic decisions about gains and 
losses. This research is based conceptually 
on animal learning theory and economic 
choice theory. It investigates how 
individual neurons in animals and brain 
regions in humans process information 
about gains (rewards) and losses 
(punishments) and use this information to 
make economic choices. As animal work 
forms an important part of this research, 
investigations are more frequently directed 
at reward than punishment. The fi eld 
also incorporates data from brain 
lesions and pharmacological 
manipulations of neurotransmitters. 
The term ‘neuroeconomics’ refers to 
the neurobiological basis of economic 
decision making. It combines economic 
choice theory with neuroscience in 
order to understand the neuronal basis 
for economic decisions. For review 
articles see Glimcher et al. 2008 and 
Schultz 2008.
The functions of rewarding and punishing 
outcomes are not defi ned by specifi c 
sensory receptors but are inferred from 
their infl uence on behaviour. Rewards are 
objects or events that induce approach 
learning (positive reinforcement in animal 
learning theory), serve as arguments for 
economic (value-related) decisions, 
engage positive emotions such as joy, and 
produce hedonic feelings. Rewards 
support elementary processes such as 
eating, drinking and sex, and engage 
individuals in such diverse behaviours as 
novelty seeking, foraging, trading on stock 
markets and social interactions. By 
contrast, punishments have largely 
opposite effects to rewards, inducing 
avoidance learning, negative emotions 
such as fear, and feelings of displeasure. 
Obtaining rewards and avoiding 
punishments is crucial for individual and 
gene survival.
Aims of neuroeconomics: 
perspective of neuroscience
The neuroscientist wants to know how the 
brain works, notably how it organises the 
behaviour that is crucial for the survival of 
the organism and its genes. What does the 
neuroscientist expect from 
neuroeconomics?
Theoretical concepts
Economic choice theory provides 
important defi nitions of decision variables 
and valid decision models. A decision 
process can be broken down into its 
different components, which is essential 
for designing well controlled behavioural 
tasks. The impact of rewards and 
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punishments is quantifi ed by gains and 
losses in subjective value, called utility, 
which can be assessed by revealed choice 
preferences. In general, outcomes are 
variable and uncertain. Outcomes are 
therefore adequately described by 
probability distributions, which are 
characterised by their expected value and 
risk. ‘Risk’ refers to the uncertainty of the 
outcome, rather than simply the chance of 
losing. The term ‘ambiguity’ denotes 
uncertainty when probability distributions 
are incompletely known. Risk and 
ambiguity infl uence decision making by 
impacting on the subjective value of risky 
outcomes.
Behavioural tools
Economics has developed behavioural and 
analytic tools to assess crucial components 
of choice behaviour. Examples are the 
following:
the Pest procedure (Parameter • 
estimation by sequential testing) 
assesses values of unknown relative to 
known outcomes;
the defi nition of subjective value by • 
Expected Utility Theory;
the impact of risk on outcome • 
valuation and choices;
the weighting of outcome probabilities, • 
loss aversion and reference dependent 
coding by Prospect Theory;
the role of past experience in updating • 
predictions of outcomes; and
the identifi cation of ‘irrational’ choices • 
of suboptimal outcomes.
Aims of neuroeconomics: 
perspective of economics
The behavioural economist wants to know 
how humans make economic decisions in 
order to survive best in a competitive 
world with limited resources. The recent 
fi nancial crisis has shown that many 
aspects of everyday life and world 
economics depend on the risk-taking 
behaviour of a few individuals. What does 
the economist expect from 
neuroeconomics?
Biological plausibility
Behavioural economics has established 
theoretical concepts for individual decision 
making. Identifi cation of neuronal signals 
for particular theoretical decision variables 
would demonstrate its biological 
plausibility, inform decision models, allow 
deconstruction of whole decision 
processes and identify crucial steps that 
might possibly go wrong.
Identifying brain states related to 
suboptimal decision making
Controlled, quantitative assessments of 
anomalies in decision making may help to 
characterise patterns of inconsistent, 
suboptimal, ‘irrational’ choices. Such 
choices may constitute normal biological 
phenomena that may not be easily 
changed without explicit policies. 
Suboptimal choices would become more 
understandable if physical, neurobiological, 
correlates were found.
Reward systems show subjective rather 
than objective value coding. Nevertheless, 
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humans tend to make irrational choices, 
which do not maximise the expected 
monetary utility of the outcome. Such 
irrational behaviour is observed often when 
emotions are involved. For instance, in the 
ultimatum game, one player proposes how 
to divide a given amount of money. The 
second player either accepts the offer and 
both players get their share, or rejects it 
and both players receive nothing. Rejection 
of any non-zero offer in this game is 
economically irrational; it is attributed to 
the sense of or outrage. Receiving fair 
offers activates the insular and prefrontal 
cortex, suggesting a neurobiological 
correlate for this emotion. Future 
economic theory might attribute an 
economic value to this emotion and 
generate new value functions with which 
choices involving emotions can become 
optimal and thus ‘rational’. In this way, 
neuroeconomics may lead to new 
normative theories that provide valid 
explanations of consistent choices across 
a wider range of human and animal choice 
behaviour than current utility and prospect 
theory.
We assume that brains evolved to assure 
the survival of genes and their carriers in 
most situations. Assuring survival in all 
possible, however unlikely, situations 
would require extra brain matter and 
function that would make brains less 
effi cient and their carriers less 
competitive. The existence of visual 
illusions demonstrates the boundaries 
imposed by such effi ciency principles. 
Even with new normative theories of 
economic decision making, exceptional 
circumstances may remain in which 
economic choices will be inadequate, in 
particular in situations for which our brains 
have not (yet) evolved.
Current state of neuroeconomic 
research: how the factors that 
infl uence decisions are 
represented in the brain
The neuroeconomic investigation of reward 
and punishment is based on the 
understanding that outcomes are defi ned 
by their value and by the risk with which 
they occur (see Schultz 2006). The brain’s 
reward (or gain) system includes the 
dopamine system, orbitofrontal cortex, 
striatum, amygdala and other cortical and 
subcortical structures in the brain. 
Punishment (or loss) is processed in similar 
structures, with the exception of the 
dopamine system which is concerned 
more with reward than punishment (see 
also Section 2.2).
Value
The value of a particular outcome depends 
on the type of outcome, its magnitude and 
its probability. Reward neurons code 
reward value by graded fi ring, increasing 
or decreasing activity. Later rewards, 
which are subjectively valued less 
(temporal discounting), induce lower value 
responses, suggesting subjective rather 
than objective value coding. Neurons code 
value relative to explicit references in all 
major reward structures. This neuronal 
property may underlie reference-
dependent reward valuation which is a 
central tenet of prospect theory. Prefrontal 
value responses show distorted responses 
to reward probability in line with prospect 
theory.
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Risk and ambiguity
Reward neurons encode risk separately 
from value (see Schultz et al. 2008). 
Prefrontal risk signals differ between risk 
avoiders and risk takers. Risk reduces 
value signals in risk avoiders and increases 
value signals in risk takers. Thus, individual 
risk attitudes may refl ect variations of 
prefrontal function. Some neuronal 
responses are stronger for ambiguity 
(uncertainty of an outcome when the 
probability of distribution of its occurrence 
is not known) than for risk.
Predictive learning
Predictions contain information about the 
value and risk of future outcomes and are 
necessary for making informed decisions. 
Neurons in all reward respond to stimuli 
that predict reward value, and some 
neurons respond to stimuli that predict 
risk. Predictions are acquired and updated 
through experience when the actual 
outcome differs from the predicted 
outcome (prediction error). Dopamine 
neurons signal prediction errors for reward 
value during learning. The insular cortex 
signals prediction errors for risk.
Current state of neuroeconomic 
research: how one possible 
action is selected from multiple 
options
We decide what to do in a particular 
situation by assessing the relative values of 
different responses. Current work in 
neuroscience aims to determine the way in 
which the different variables and choice 
options are represented in the brain. These 
studies are based on a number of theories 
(see also Section 2.4), for example:
Reinforcement learning theory
The ultimate behavioural consequence of a 
decision is an action. Each possible action 
leads to a particular outcome which has 
specifi c value, and the action leading to 
the highest value is selected. Neurons 
track the outcome values of the individual 
actions (‘action value’). Rational decision 
makers select the action producing the 
highest action value. This action is the 
result of a competition between neurons 
carrying different action values.
Theories of evidence accumulation
Neuronal activity in parietal and frontal 
cortex develops gradually as evidence 
about the values of the available options 
accumulates. So-called diffusion-race 
models conceptualise how the fi rst option 
reaching a threshold is chosen (see Gold 
and Shadlen 2007).
Current state of neuroeconomic 
research: social decisions
One of the great promises of 
neuroeconomics is the use of formal tests 
for studying neuronal processes underlying 
social interactions, including the role of 
emotions in decision making.
Apes and monkeys
Behavioural work on nonhuman primates 
identifi es ‘rational’ maximisation without 
54  I  January 2011  I  Brain Waves Module 1 The Royal Society
regard for others in the ultimatum game. 
Neurophysiological work on monkeys uses 
economic games against computer 
opponents, showing activity related to 
subjective preferences and past actions 
and rewards. However, the extent to 
which monkeys perceive such games as a 
social activity is unclear. Ongoing 
neurophysiological work on interacting 
monkeys investigates basic processes 
such as video game competition and 
reward observation.
Outcome observation in humans
Human social economic neuroimaging 
studies employ straightforward situations 
such as observation of reward and 
punishment received by others. For 
example:
The effect of reward on the striatum is • 
relative on the reward received by 
others;
Seeing another person making errors • 
in predicting a reward whilst learning 
the same task activates the striatum;
Observing another person receiving • 
painful stimuli activates a neuronal 
correlate for empathy in the cingulate 
and insular cortex;
Following the behaviour of others in • 
the valuation of outcomes activates the 
striatum.
Games in humans
Human studies often use formal economic 
games to standardise and measure 
emotions. The most popular tools are:
Dictator game: The player splits a • 
received endowment with another 
player. The game tests fairness and 
aversion to inequity;
Ultimatum game (described above): • 
The game tests fairness, inequity 
aversion and outrage;
Trust game: The amount of money one • 
player gives to another player is 
multiplied by the experimenter. The 
other player gives back an amount 
which is multiplied again, and so forth. 
The game tests trust, reciprocation, 
cooperation and fairness;
Prisoner’s dilemma: Rewards are • 
assigned to two players depending on 
their cooperation with each other. If 
the fi rst player cooperates but the 
second player ‘betrays’ his/her, the fi rst 
player receives the worst possible 
outcome and the second player the 
best, thus tempting the second player. 
If both cooperate or both betray each 
other, they receive intermediate 
outcomes, which are higher for 
cooperation than betrayal. The game 
tests cooperation against defection 
and self-interest:
Public goods game. Players can put • 
goods into a pot to be split between 
the group. The game tests prosocial 
attitude, cooperation, altruism and 
defection.
Several brain activations are observed in 
such studies (see Frith and Singer 2008). 
Many socially and emotionally positive 
situations activate the brain’s reward 
system, including fairness in the ultimatum 
game; cooperation in prisoner’s dilemma; 
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reciprocation and intention to trust in the 
trust game; and altruistic punishment of 
players who were uncooperative in the 
trust or prisoner’s dilemma game. 
Donations to charities activate the 
striatum, despite one’s own money loss. 
Activations in the amygdala correlate with 
the trustworthiness of faces (see Figure 4); 
correspondingly, lesions of the amygdala 
reduce the recognition of trustworthiness 
of faces. Many aversive situations activate 
the brain’s punishment system in the 
anterior cingulate and insula, including 
receiving unfair and likely unacceptable 
offers in the ultimatum game. In line with 
its cognitive control functions in behaviour, 
the prefrontal cortex is activated when 
unfair offers in the ultimatum game are 
rejected.
Policy questions
Neuroeconomics is starting to uncover the 
neurobiological basis for the properties of 
economic valuations and decisions. In 
some cases, these valuations lead to daily 
choices that could be disadvantageous to 
individuals and society. By increasing our 
understanding of these processes we may 
be able to fi nd means to avoid their 
detrimental consequences.
We know that certain reward values are 
coded ‘inaccurately’ in the brain. For 
example, we know that the reward 
processes in the striatum tend to discount 
the values of future rewards (temporal 
value discounting). This may be a factor 
that leads us to invest less in provisions for 
the future (such as education, healthcare 
or pensions) than we ‘should’ do. Similarly, 
events of low probability (such as an 
appalling murder or terrorism) can be 
overvalued in the brain (the rewarding 
nature of novelty), a factor that might 
contribute to resources being diverted 
from issues that affect the majority of the 
population.
The encouraging news is that social 
cooperation activates the reward centres 
of the brain that are involved in plasticity 
and learning. As we understand more 
about the processing of reward in the 
brain, it may be possible to infl uence our 
own brains and those of future generations 
to reward the things that are actually 
rational for us in the longer term.
Individual variations in how our brains 
process reward
Variations in brain function across 
individuals appear inevitable given the 
complex nature of the brain. As our 
understanding of individual 
neurobiological variations in reward 
processing (both natural and pathological) 
increases, we can unpack the economic 
consequences of these variations. Early 
indications highlight possible roles for this 
variation in reward processing in very 
diverse areas:
risk avoidance and anxiety disorders;• 
risk seeking (an area where the • 
behaviour of a few individuals may 
impact economically on the majority);
obesity;• 
drug addiction (both pathological • 
infl uences of drugs on reward signals 
and natural variation); and 
gambling.• 
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Neuromarketing
A practical application of neuroeconomics 
concerns consumer behaviour. Demand 
for goods can be infl uenced by several 
factors, many of which impact on the 
reward system of the brain. Neurons in all 
reward structures respond to stimuli that 
predict rewards, and these can be 
conditioned in a Pavlovian manner without 
the active participation of the subject. For 
example, reward predictions stimulate 
dopamine neurons, and the stimulation of 
dopamine neurons in rats induces 
approach behaviour and learning. 
Understanding more about these reward 
predictive stimuli could help us appreciate 
the biological foundations of individual 
consumer behaviour and perhaps even 
intervene when this behaviour becomes 
detrimental.
In addition, a recent study on wine tasting 
shows that the same wine elicits a 
stronger reward value signal when its price 
information is infl ated. These data suggest 
a neurobiological basis for the infl uence of 
external infl uences such as pricing on 
subjective valuation. Furthermore, studies 
show that the brain values rewards relative 
to external references, such as the current 
economic situation and the rewards of 
social partners. This may explain in part 
why the wealthy are not necessarily any 
happier than those less well off.
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this functional magnetic resonance image (fMRI) light up. In this case ‘lighting up’ means 
there is increased blood fl ow to the areas that are working hardest. Functional MRI allows 
these regions to be visualized. They can then be superimposed onto a 3D reconstruction of 
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3 Neuroscience and society
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Background
Neuroscience is of growing importance in 
the 21st century given the rapid 
technological advances in this area and 
their impact on society. For example, 
neuroscience is critical to the 
understanding of the brain in health and 
disease and in developing more accurate 
diagnosis and new treatments across the 
lifespan. To illustrate, cognitive training 
treatments are under development for 
disorders such as attention defi cit 
hyperactivity disorder (ADHD) (see 
Figure 5) and substance abuse, and drugs 
that protect the nervous system from 
degradation are being developed for 
Alzheimer’s disease. Recent innovative 
proof of concept studies for drugs such as 
ketamine and scopolamine suggest that it 
might be possible to treat patients for 
depression effectively and very rapidly.
For neuropsychiatric disorders and also for 
brain injury, cognitive enhancing drugs are 
being used and further developed to 
improve functional outcome, quality of life 
and wellbeing (see also Section 2.2 and 
Box 2). This area of research in 
neuroscience raises important neuroethical 
issues, such as the increasing use of so-
called ‘lifestyle drugs’ including ‘smart 
drugs’ by healthy people. The neuroethics 
of this and other areas is discussed in more 
detail in Section 3.3 (see also Section 3.2).
During the next decade, there will be 
marked advances in the use of 
neuroscience in education in helping 
children to learn in schools. This will lead 
to evidence-based programmes of 
individualised or personalised learning. 
This area, termed ‘educational 
neuroscience’, is addressed in depth in 
Module 2 of the Brain Waves project, 
Neuroscience: implications for education 
and lifelong learning.
Other areas of neuroscience too will fl ourish, 
including those that intersect with social 
sciences and genetics, such as studies on 
whether, and under what conditions, we 
choose prosocial over antisocial or non-
cooperative behaviour. The intersection of 
neuroscience with information technology 
will expand and further develop, including 
neural interface systems, neuroprosthetics 
and functional Magnetic Resonance 
Imaging (fMRI) feedback (see Sections 2.1, 
2.3 and Box 3).
Deep brain stimulation is another area 
which continues to develop rapidly for 
treatment for neuropsychiatric disorders, 
including depression, obsessive 
compulsive disorder and Parkinson’s 
disease. This involves surgically implanting 
a medical device that stimulates specifi c 
parts of the brain. Similarly, stem cell 
research applied to the treatment of 
neuropsychiatric disorders continues to 
progress (see Section 2.3 and Box 4).
Application to policy
Certain areas of neuroscience will be 
important for public health policy. For 
3.1 Benefi ts and opportunities
Professor Barbara J Sahakian, University of Cambridge
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Figure 5 This image shows a) in green: major white matter tracts generated from a 
population of 32 subjects-16 healthy volunteers and 16 adult patients with attention defi cit/
hyperactivity disorder (ADHD) b) in red: regions where these tracts were found to be 
abnormal in ADHD patients compared to controls and c) in yellow: regions of reduced white 
matter density in ADHD patients compared to controls. A, b and c are overlaid on a high 
resolution brain template acquired with magnetic resonance imaging (MRI). (Reproduced 
courtesy of Natalia del Campo, University of Cambridge.)
prevented, while others could be treated 
effectively before they develop a chronic, 
relapsing or progressive course. 
Furthermore, new insights into underlying 
mechanisms, coupled with the use of 
more selective cohorts in clinical trials, is 
essential for the development of effective 
drugs in Alzheimer’s disease.
Strong links should be fostered between 
academia and industry to allow valuable 
collaborations to facilitate drug 
development and evaluation. As we move 
further into the 21st century, it is important 
example, early deprivation and poverty, in 
interaction with genetic predisposition, are 
key factors in future mental health 
problems. Interventions are needed to 
counteract the effects of these factors. It is 
essential to develop the brain’s resilience 
to damage by promoting mental as well as 
physical health from an early age. It is also 
important to stress that certain behaviours 
have positive impacts on both mental and 
physical health, and these behaviours 
should be promoted accordingly. For 
instance, exercise stimulates the 
development of nerve tissue in some 
regions of the brain (Olson et al. 2006).
Another example is the importance of early 
detection and treatment, as well as the 
need for new treatments, for 
neuropsychiatric disorders, such as 
depression and Alzheimer’s disease. For 
example, genetic, cerebrospinal fl uid (CSF) 
and blood, cognitive and neuroimaging 
biomarkers can play an important part in 
early identifi cation of these disorders. This 
would enable some disorders to be 
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to develop novel treatments, drug-based 
and otherwise, based on symptoms rather 
than the specifi c diagnosis. For example, it 
would be more productive to focus on 
symptoms, such as impulsivity, across 
diagnostic categories (such as mania, 
ADHD and substance abuse) or specifi c 
cognitive functions (eg impaired episodic 
memory) irrespective of disease diagnosis 
(Sahakian et al. 2010; MRC 2010). To 
illustrate this, a treatment that reduces 
impulsive behaviour may do so whether a 
person has a diagnosis of ADHD or 
substance abuse. Similarly, a treatment for 
certain memory problems may be useful 
for improving cognition and functional 
outcome in both mild Alzheimer’s disease 
and fi rst episode schizophrenia. 
Symptoms, such as impulsivity, refl ect 
genetics and underlying neurobiology and 
are therefore more likely to be tractable 
targets for treatment, compared with a 
heterogeneous category from diagnostic 
manuals.
Industrial partnerships could promote the 
development of biomarkers and 
neurocognitive training research, as well 
as novel drug development. Proof of 
concept studies with ketamine and 
scopolamine indicate novel areas for the 
pharmaceutical industry to pursue which 
would result in great benefi ts for patients 
with depression (Berman et al. 2000; 
Zarate et al. 2006; Drevets and Furey 
2010). Unlike the currently used selective 
serotonin reuptake inhibitors (SSRIs), with 
which depressed patients take weeks to 
show improvements, new drugs with 
different mechanisms work very rapidly. In 
addition, small molecule drug design is of 
growing importance as it holds potential 
to deliver better and more effective 
treatments. Translational medicine—the 
process of turning biological discoveries 
into drugs and medical devices that will 
help patients—is a UK strength. In 
addition, these partnerships could 
promote the development of 
pharmacogenomics, the discipline behind 
how genes infl uence the body’s response 
to drugs. This might lead to a 
‘personalised medicine’ approach to 
mental wellbeing, with individuals being 
given treatments tailored according to 
their genotype (see also Section 2.2).
Other novel approaches to understanding 
and treating brain diseases will include 
synapse proteomics. Irregularities in the 
sets of synapse proteins (chemicals in the 
junctions between nerve cells) cause 
particular clinical symptoms shared 
between diseases. This provides a novel 
route for the pharmaceutical industry, 
since ‘blockbuster’ drugs that have large 
markets and are useful in many individuals 
can be developed. Sets of synapse 
proteins can be targeted by drugs that 
should be useful in the treatment of 
multiple diseases.
The discovery of hundreds of new synapse 
proteins also provides a new set of 
potential drug targets. For example, to 
date, by far the greatest effort of 
pharmaceutical companies has been on 
the neurotransmitters (chemicals that send 
a signal from one nerve cell to the next) 
and their receptors and uptake systems. 
These comprise less than 10% of all 
synapse proteins, which leaves the other 
90% to investigate. This provides an 
investment opportunity. The study of 
molecular functions at synapses and their 
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importance in behaviour is rapidly 
developing. Synapse proteomics will be of 
increasing importance in genomic 
diagnostics of brain diseases. For instance, 
from data on genetic disorders that affect 
the nervous system, it was found that over 
130 brain diseases are caused by 
mutations in synapse proteins (Bayes and 
Grant 2009; Fernandez et al. 2009). It is 
already clear that autism, schizophrenia 
and bipolar disorder involve dozens of 
synapse proteins. This further emphasises 
the important point that future diagnostics 
will be likely to involve careful clinical 
phenotyping (classifi cation of observable 
characteristics) using, for example, 
cognitive testing and brain imaging, but 
also genetic diagnosis.
Other novel neuroscientifi c approaches to 
understanding and treating 
neuropsychiatric disorders, such as 
Parkinson’s disease, exist. For example, 
there are highly innovative techniques 
using optics to control neural activity 
(Gradinaru et al. 2010). These techniques 
allow for the control of cellular activity by 
exposure to light. Specifi c cells can be 
excited or inhibited by different 
wavelengths of light, a technique that is 
both spatially and temporally precise. 
These optogenetic methods (an emerging 
fi eld that combines optics and genetics to 
probe neural circuits) have been 
demonstrated to be effective in many 
species and are likely to have wide 
applications in the future (Boyden et al. 
2005). Optogenetics has been used to 
investigate synaptic connections within 
neuronal networks (Petreanu et al. 2007) 
and synaptic plasticity (Zhang et al. 2008). 
Used alongside Magnetic Resonance 
Imaging (MRI), it may prove especially 
valuable (Wells et al. 2010). Moreover, the 
technique has proved benefi cial in 
restoring visual function in mice (Lagali 
et al. 2008) and so has applicability to 
treating forms of human blindness. 
Optogenetic therapy also holds promising 
potential for the treatment of neurological 
diseases. The technique has now been 
used in the study of Parkinson’s disease 
where it can be used to investigate how 
symptoms are produced by different 
pathways in the brain (Kravitz et al. 2010). 
A recent study in Nature (Kravitz et al. 
2010) indicated in a mouse model of 
Parkinson’s disease that regulation of 
motor behaviours by optogenetic control 
was possible and that a modulation of 
circuitry may represent an effective 
therapeutic strategy for ameliorating motor 
defi cits in patients with Parkinson’s 
disease. While optogenetic techniques 
hold great promise for translational studies 
to aid understanding of neural 
mechanisms in neuropsychiatric disease, it 
remains to be determined whether these 
techniques can be used in humans.
Opportunities
The prospect of new technologies and new 
treatments for neuropsychiatric disorders 
and brain injury for the benefi t of patients, 
society and the economy is extremely 
exciting. Many opportunities for their 
commercialisation exist, including those 
described above. These may be developed 
through public-private partnerships in 
some instances.
Important innovation in the area of 
neurocognitive activation (cognitive 
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training) could be exploited commercially 
for the benefi t of society relatively rapidly. 
This is an important new technique which 
could easily be exploited through the UK 
Games Industry. It could be used in 
entertainment games for training impulse 
or cognitive control in children and 
adolescents with ADHD or substance 
abuse problems. It could also be used for 
training episodic memory in elderly people 
with amnestic mild cognitive impairment 
(aMCI), the onset stage of Alzheimer’s 
disease. Klingberg (2010) has 
demonstrated the power of the technique 
by showing that training on a working 
memory task is associated with changes in 
brain activity in specifi c regions of the 
brain, as well as changes in the densities 
of certain types of receptors in healthy 
people. Therefore this technique could be 
useful for young and old healthy people, in 
addition to those with neuropsychiatric 
disorders and brain injury. The challenge 
for the games industry or other markets is 
to transform this training from a chore into 
a fun and enjoyable activity.
Other areas provide fi nancial opportunities 
for neuroscientifi c development, although 
the gain to society is unclear, such as 
neuromarketing (see Section 2.5). Studies 
in this area have used decision making and 
purchasing paradigms together with fMRI 
technology to indicate, for example, that a 
preference for the drink Coke may be 
infl uenced by brand image rather than by 
the taste itself.
Challenges and solutions
Neuroscience is coming of age and can be 
successfully applied to important problems 
in health and disease to ensure the UK is 
economically competitive and that our 
society fl ourishes. Therefore it is 
unfortunate that there has been a recent 
withdrawal of some drug companies, 
including UK-based ones, from the 
development of new drugs for the 
treatment of psychiatric disorders (Miller 
2010) (see also Sections 2.2 and 3.2).
Two actions which might stimulate central 
nervous system (CNS) research and 
development enterprise are: i) to extend 
the patent life of a new drug for psychiatry 
to ensure that the enormous development 
costs are taken into account; and ii) to 
make new mental health treatments a 
priority by speeding access and 
development of new drugs/products for 
mental health, as is done for HIV/AIDS.
A more diffi cult problem to solve is the 
sensitivity of ‘accepted outcome 
measures’ to change and early stage 
disease, such as those used by the US 
Food and Drug Administration (FDA) and 
European Medicines Agency (EMA). This is 
particularly true where early detection is 
important and where neuroprotective 
drugs can be given. Treatments, including 
pharmacological ones, need to be given 
early—before the patient has marked 
impairments in occupational and social 
functioning and reduced quality of life and 
wellbeing. (The standard diagnostic 
manuals require a decline and impairment 
in social and occupational functioning for a 
diagnosis of dementia). Therefore this 
challenge may lead to an opportunity to 
innovate the drug development process, 
for instance targets for treatment may 
become closely related to genetics and 
neurobiology (eg impulsivity, episodic 
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memory) rather than diagnostic categories 
(eg schizophrenia, ADHD) (see Sahakian 
et al. 2010). Another challenge is the true 
translation of Proof of Concept studies to 
Phase 3 clinical trials, as it is diffi cult to 
replicate exactly the methodology used in 
these two stages. Finally, other challenges 
for research studies include extensive 
bureaucracy (such as paperwork for 
research and development funding, ethical 
reviews, and intellectual property rights 
protection) and the reluctance of research 
sponsors to tolerate risk.
Other European opportunities in response 
to this need to ‘repair’ the CNS research 
and development enterprise may include: 
funding via organisations such as the 
Innovative Medicines Initiative (IMI),a 
partnership between the European 
Community and the European Federation 
of Pharmaceutical Industries and 
Associates (EFPIA); grant funding from the 
EU via the national research councils; 
development of a capability cluster in 
mental health; and increased integration 
between disciplines, particularly psychiatry 
and neurology.
Conclusion
In summary, there are extensive 
opportunities for neuroscience to 
contribute evidence-based advice to 
policymakers, health professionals, the 
private sector and the public. Public 
engagement in neuroscience is a rapidly 
growing area. ‘Smart drugs’ or cognitive 
enhancing drugs (eg modafi nil) and their 
benefi ts for healthy people have been of 
keen interest. If these drugs are shown by 
the pharmaceutical industry to be safe and 
effective in long-term studies, policy 
change might allow these to be marketed 
through the usual routes. This would 
reduce potential harms of current internet 
purchase of these ‘smart drugs’ and may 
be of particular aid to certain groups in 
society such as elderly people (see also 
Sections 2.2, 3.2 and Box 2).
Furthermore, there is a global market for 
adaptive learning technologies. Marketing 
e-books and TV programmes are thus far 
an unexploited area. These types of 
initiatives can have importance for lifelong 
learning. Education and learning are 
known to enhance cognitive reserve, and 
better cognitive function is associated with 
better wellbeing (Beddington et al. 2008). 
Both science and technology and higher 
levels of cognitive abilities and education 
are linked to increased prosperity (eg 
increased gross domestic product) (see, 
eg, Royal Society 2010; Rindermann 2008). 
Furthermore, investment in mental health 
has provided substantial economic benefi t 
in the past and should continue to do so in 
the future (Health Economics Research 
Group, Offi ce of Health Economics, RAND 
Europe 2008).
Neuroscience can provide us with the tools 
to make the most of our minds and also 
the necessary platform for an economically 
competitive and fl ourishing society. Now it 
is up to us as neuroscientists, the 
government and society to transform this 
potential into a reality.
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3.2 Risks
Professor Steven Rose, The Open University
Background
The rapid advances in neuroscience of the 
past decades, and those that can be 
anticipated in the near and mid-future, 
bring with them not merely new 
knowledge of how the brain works, with 
profound implications for humanity’s 
understanding of itself, but also actual and 
potential technologies with associated 
benefi ts and risks. Both have been widely 
discussed in the media. This section is 
concerned to balance the risks against the 
perceived benefi ts discussed more 
extensively in other sections (see eg 
Section 3.1).
Is increased knowledge of the 
brain itself hazardous?
Some argue that increasing knowledge of 
brain mechanisms and their relationship to 
such deeply personal and private 
characteristics as memory, cognition, 
emotion and even consciousness, risks 
diminishing our sense of having 
independent agency and free will. We will 
be nothing other than neuronal machines, 
driven by the complex fi ring patterns of the 
cells in our brains, themselves the 
inevitable product of the interplay between 
genes and environment during our 
development.
This interpretation is itself vigorously 
contested among philosophers and 
neuroscientists—compare for instance, the 
views of Singer on the one hand (see 
Section 2.4) with Chan and Harris on the 
other in this volume (see Section 3.3). 
Some distinguished neuroscientists 
celebrate such a reduction of mind to brain 
(eg Crick 1994) whilst some philosophers 
view it with foreboding (eg Habermas 
2003). I take neither view. Instead I would 
argue that any genuine increase in 
knowledge of brain processes and their 
pre- and post-natal development can only 
enrich our understanding of ourselves. Nor 
can such increased knowledge replace or 
diminish the insights into what it is to be 
human that come from philosophy, the 
social sciences or the humanities—
although these disciplines will need to take 
the fi ndings of neuroscience into account, 
just as neuroscience will need to respect 
these other perspectives and 
understandings. Here, therefore, there 
should only be benefi ts, providing one can 
pick one’s way through the ‘over-hyping’ 
of apparent neuroscientifi c claims and the 
attendant prophesies of doom that so 
attract media attention.
Neurotechnoscience
Technosciences involve research 
enterprises in which the old distinctions 
between science and technology have 
broken down. It is not just that one cannot 
say where the science stops and the 
technology begins, but that the two are 
inseparable, each both driving forward and 
being driven by the other. And it is as a 
technoscience that the risks and benefi ts 
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of advances in the study of the brain may 
be seen as more fi nely balanced. To judge 
these requires refl ecting not merely on the 
potential of developments discussed in the 
previous sections, but also on the 
intentions and goals of those who fund 
them—primarily the State, pharmaceutical 
companies, medical charities, 
supranational organisations such as the 
European Commission, and the military. In 
awarding funds each organisation will have 
specifi c ends in view, and these must be 
taken into account as we consider their 
implications (see also Section 3.4).
Policy issues
Neurogenetics and the 
pharmaceutical industry
Many neurological and psychiatric 
disorders run in families, and in some 
cases genes have been identifi ed that 
increase the probability of a person having 
a particular disorder (see also Section 3.1). 
Huntington’s disease (HD), which results in 
increasing motor and mental incapacity in 
middle life, is a single gene disorder where 
both the gene and its biochemical and 
cellular consequences are well known and 
predictable. The same is true for rare forms 
of Alzheimer’s disease (AD), which strike in 
mid-life rather than, as in most cases, older 
age. There are also known genetic risk 
factors for the more common forms of the 
disease, but these are probabilistic rather 
than predictive.
The situation is less clear for the common 
psychiatric disorders such as depression 
or schizophrenia, whose mode of 
transmission is obscure and for which, 
despite decades of research, no 
unequivocal and replicable genetic 
markers have been identifi ed. Rather, the 
modern techniques of genome wide 
association studies (GWAS) suggest that 
there may be tens or even hundreds of 
genes which, individually or in 
combination and varying from individual to 
individual, may affect the risk for the 
disorder. Under these circumstances, the 
benefi ts of genetic testing of an individual 
for the predisposition may well be 
outweighed by the risks of false diagnosis 
(either positive or negative) with its 
consequent implications for how a person 
plans his/her life. Even when a relatively 
certain genetic diagnosis can be made, as 
in the case of HD, experience has shown 
that many of those known to be at risk of 
the disease decline the test, preferring 
uncertainty, especially where there is no 
effective treatment, as is still the case 
for HD.
Some commercial companies offer tests 
for one of the genetic risk factors for AD, 
the gene ApoE4, but this practice worries 
both genetic counsellors and ethicists, as a 
positive result is indicative only of a 
potential risk factor and provides little 
guidance as to how one should live one’s 
life, whilst adding to a person’s burden of 
anxiety such that every small slip in 
memory may be taken as a warning of the 
impending onset of the disease. 
Nonetheless in an unregulated or only 
lightly regulated biotechnological 
economy, the availability of such tests is 
likely to increase substantially in the 
coming years (see eg Collins 2010).
One of the major goals for 
neuropharmacology must be to develop 
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drugs to treat or alleviate these conditions. 
Both the record and the prospects are 
mixed. In the case of AD, even though the 
triggering events for the disease are 
unknown, the biochemical cascade that 
leads to the accumulation of plaques and 
tangles and the death of neurons is well 
understood, providing many potential 
targets for drug action. Whilst the present 
generation of drugs is not very effective, 
there are several promising new 
developments. Most such drugs are aimed 
at slowing the cognitive decline 
characteristic of AD. In this sense the 
drugs are cognitive enhancers (see also 
Section 2.2, 3.1 and Box 2). The benefi ts 
of such drugs—at the least in enabling 
AD sufferers to maintain a longer period 
of independent living—are clear. However, 
as they do not prevent the inexorable 
neurodegeneration that the disease 
entails, some have questioned whether 
living with the knowledge of that fate 
rather than benign neglect is always 
benefi cial.
There is some evidence that drugs like the 
statins, used to control cholesterol levels, 
and folic acid may be marginally 
neuroprotective, as are ‘brain exercises’ on 
the ‘use it or lose it’ principle (see also 
Section 3.1). There have also been very 
recent claims to have identifi ed a ‘marker’ 
molecule, present in cerebrospinal fl uid 
that can predict the onset of the disease 
before any behavioural indications of its 
onset. The benefi ts that would accrue from 
developing a truly protective agent against 
neurodegeneration would be enormous, 
even when set against the risks of the 
widespread prophylactic drug taking over 
many years.
For psychiatric diagnoses such as 
schizophrenia and depression, the 
situation is less optimistic. Despite earlier 
hopes and claims, the newer generation of 
selective serotonin reuptake inhibitor drugs 
(SSRIs) to treat depression have turned 
out, when widely prescribed, to be little 
more effective that the earlier ones in 
treating what the World Health 
Organization has categorised as a 
worldwide epidemic of depression. 
However, people’s responses to the drugs 
are very variable, and one hope, though 
not yet realised, is that GWAS might make 
it possible to identify subsets of the 
population who could benefi t most from 
any of the different classes of drugs that 
are available, Nonetheless, it is perhaps in 
recognition of these diffi culties, and the 
sheer seeming intractability of the problem 
that, as mentioned by Robbins and 
Sahakian (see Sections 2.2 and 3.1), 
several of the major pharmaceutical 
companies have abandoned their drug 
discovery programmes for these disorders, 
whilst retaining those for frank 
neurological conditions such as AD or 
Parkinson’s Disease (Miller 2010).
Drugs for social control?
The US Diagnostic and Statistical Manual 
(DSMIV), regarded as the psychiatrists’ 
bible, is currently undergoing revision, but 
a category of disorders that is likely to 
remain in one form or another is that 
which relates not to relatively clear-cut 
psychiatric conditions but those concerned 
with an individual’s behaviour—conditions 
such as (in the current classifi cations), 
conduct disorder, oppositional defi ance 
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disorder and, attention defi cit hyperactivity 
disorder (ADHD).
The frequency with which such diagnoses 
are being made has increased dramatically 
over the past two decades. ADHD (then 
called minimal brain dysfunction), 
considered to affect no more than one in 
several hundred children in the UK in the 
1980s, is now estimated to be present in 
from 1–5% of children—mainly boys—
between 6 and teenage. The diagnosis is 
based primarily around a child’s unruly, 
disobedient or inattentive behaviour at 
school and home. There are no 
unequivocal neurological or neurochemical 
markers to correlate with the diagnosis. 
There are, however, pharmaceutical 
approaches to correcting or modifying 
these behaviours, most notably the 
amphetamine-like drug methylphenidate 
(Ritalin).
Ritalin prescriptions in the UK have 
increased from around 2000 a year in the 
early 1990s to approaching 600,000 a year 
today, though with very marked regional 
variations. Ritalin and related drugs 
certainly make a child calmer in class, less 
troublesome to teachers and parents. 
However, the long-term effects of the 
drug, on a growing child’s brain and 
behaviour, have not been fully assessed.
An unanswered question is why a disorder 
considered rare several decades ago 
should now be diagnosed with such 
frequency. Did it exist unrecognised earlier, 
with children being called naughty or 
delinquent rather than as having a brain 
disorder? (The increase in autism 
diagnoses over the decades is a 
comparable example). Have society’s 
criteria for what is or is not acceptable 
changed? Or might the problem lie less in 
the brain of the child and more in the 
parenting practices or social environment?
There is a more general issue at stake here, 
and that is the use of drugs as a means of 
social control. Whilst there are 
undoubtedly children who could benefi t 
from the drugs, such medicalisation of 
behaviours regarded as outside the norm, 
to use Chan and Harris’ term (See Section 
3.3), may turn out to be an example of 
what Stirling categorises as missed 
opportunity or forced tramlines (see 
Section 3.4). By focussing on the individual 
and positing that the source of his or her 
distress lies in some molecular disorder in 
the brain, we may miss the broader social 
public health context (from economic 
insecurity to poor schooling or inadequate 
parenting) that affects the brain and makes 
the distress manifest. In focussing on ‘a 
pill for every ill’ do we risk moving towards 
what a neurophysiologist once referred to 
(approvingly) as a ‘psychocivilised society’—
and what, less approvingly, Aldous Huxley 
wrote about in Brave New World?
More immediately, in the US, where the 
use of Ritalin has been more widespread 
for far longer than in the UK, the FDA has 
called attention to the extent to which it is 
being widely traded amongst 
schoolchildren on the grounds that its 
attention-enhancing effects are an aid to 
study and preparing for exams. As 
discussed by Robbins (see Section 2.2), a 
number of respondents—predominantly 
from the US—to a survey conducted by 
Nature amongst its readers as to whether 
they use cognitive enhancers also reported 
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that they had or currently still used Ritalin 
in this way.
Ritalin is of course not the only drug to be 
considered as a cognitive enhancer (see 
Section 2.2 and Box 2). A wide variety of 
agents with very different mechanisms of 
action have been proposed, mainly on the 
basis of animal experiments and often 
without good evidence as to their effects 
in humans, to act as cognitive enhancers, 
giving rise to much ethical debate (see 
Section 3.3) and media speculation. 
Concern has been expressed over whether 
the use of such drugs outside a medical 
context confers an unfair advantage on 
their users in competitive examinations. 
Should such ‘steroids for the brain’ be 
regulated as in sport? Even if it were 
possible—and the wide availability of 
Ritalin for purchase via the web suggests 
that it would be diffi cult—would it be 
appropriate? How different, ethically, is the 
deliberate and voluntary taking of a 
cognitive enhancer to employing a tutor or 
enjoying the educational advantages that, 
in a profoundly unequal society such as 
Britain, come with class and income (Rose, 
2002)?
Imaging and neural interfaces
As discussed by Rees (see Section 2.1), 
once they had moved beyond the 
experimental province of physicists, 
virtually all modern neuroimaging 
techniques were developed with 
diagnostic aims in mind: Computed Axial 
Tomography (CAT or CT), Positron 
Emission Tomography (PET), Magnetic 
Resonance Imaging (MRI) and functional 
MRI (fMRI) are examples. Perhaps the 
exception is magnetoencephalography 
(MEG). Barring the usual problems with all 
scanning techniques—of both false 
positives and false negatives—the clinical 
benefi ts to neurosurgery and neurology 
scarcely need stressing. The only risk 
seems to be the general one: that modern 
medicine and clinical practice sometimes 
seem to substitute diagnosis for 
treatment—as for instance in the use of 
MRI scans to detect spinal disc injury as a 
substitute for, or addition to, clinical 
judgement even when surgical intervention 
is not contemplated.
Similarly, at fi rst glance the neural 
interfaces discussed by Tracey (see Section 
2.3 and Box 3) would seem only benefi cial, 
in their potential to compensate for loss of 
sensory or motor abilities—though their 
military applications are more disturbing. 
However, the science fi ction possibilities of 
such prostheses—as described for 
example by Gibson (2000)—open the 
prospect of a dystopic world of 
cyberpeople: part human, part engineered, 
refl ecting in fi ction Habermas’s concerns 
(see also Section 3.3).
There are, however, two main areas in 
which developments in imaging 
techniques raise immediate social 
concerns. Both relate to the consequences 
of living in an increasingly security- and 
surveillance-obsessed society. Could brain 
imaging be a further step down the path 
pioneered by the ubiquitous CCTV 
cameras and national DNA databases—
that is, as a further restriction on an 
individual’s privacy? Might brain imaging 
provide an internal surveillance of our 
thoughts, emotions and intentions to add 
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to the external surveillance of the 
cameras? Not Brave New World but 1984 
updated?
Claims that brain imaging (‘Brain 
Fingerprinting’) could serve as an updated 
form of lie detection have been treated 
with some scepticism by the imaging 
community (See Box 1), but a number of 
commercial companies now offer devices 
claiming to do just this, mainly based on 
the measurement of evoked response 
potentials—an application of the 
electroencephalography (EEG) technique 
discussed by Rees (see Section 2.1). The 
company websites suggest their use to 
detect whether someone ‘is a terrorist’ or 
has visited ‘terrorist training camps’ as 
well as in the courts to help determine 
guilt or innocence. The use of such 
techniques has been admitted into trials in 
India and the US, though not so far in the 
UK (Rose 2006). These issues will be 
addressed in more detail in Module 4 of 
the Brain Waves project on neuroscience, 
responsibility and the law.
Of at least as great concern are the 
suggestions that brain imaging can provide 
a prospective diagnosis of a person’s 
potential for criminal activity or 
psychopathic violence. There have been 
claims that MRI or fMRI could detect 
characteristic differences in brain 
structures or neural activity between 
incarcerated men convicted of murder or 
other violent crimes and either non-violent 
criminals or ‘normal’ people. However a 
major problem with such studies is that 
they are post-hoc. The violent murderers 
studied have been in prison, often for long 
periods of time, have a history of the use 
of both legal and illegal drugs, and many 
other potentially relevant experiences. 
Although there have been claims that it is 
possible to detect propensity to 
psychopathy, based on psychological and 
even biological measures in young 
children, whether useful predictive brain 
differences could be found prior to crime, 
conviction and imprisonment is simply not 
known. Furthermore, even if such 
predictions could reliably be made, it is a 
cardinal principle of law that intentions or 
predispositions in the absence of acts are 
not crimes—unless we are truly to move 
towards a 1984-type category of ‘thought 
crime.’ The argument that individuals ‘at 
risk’ should be scanned and subjected to 
an appropriate remedial or control regime, 
and the individual could choose whether 
to be subject to it rather than coerced, fails 
on the grounds both that any such brain 
fi ndings are likely to include many false 
positives, and a lack of knowledge about 
just what would constitute an appropriate 
remedial regime. It is doubtful whether 
there would be any added value provided 
by a brain scan above that given by 
standard psychiatric evaluation.
More directly interventive are the 
expanding applications of transcranial 
magnetic stimulation (TMS) (see Box 4). 
TMS has been proposed as a potential 
therapeutic approach to mitigate the 
effects of neurological conditions such as 
Parkinson’s, to alleviate depression, or as 
an alternative or adjunct to cognitive 
behaviour therapy in obsessive/
compulsive disorders. In these senses it 
would seem to carry a similar balance of 
benefi ts and possible risks as do 
pharmacological interventions. However, 
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the declared interest of the US military 
(see below) in exploring the uses of TMS 
as a method of thought and behaviour 
control, though still in the realm of basic 
research and even science fi ction, raises 
the same issues of privacy versus social 
control and manipulation discussed 
above.
The military and 
neurotechnoscience
Military interest in neurotechnoscience is 
directed towards two general goals: 
improving the effi ciency of one’s own 
forces, and diminishing that of an enemy. 
Most available information comes from the 
US, where the military and its research 
organisations such as the Defence 
Advanced Research Projects Agency 
(DARPA) have a long record of funding 
work in this area, and where information is 
much more freely available than in other 
more secretive states. Current concerns 
centre on two areas: psychoactive 
chemicals; and behaviour modifi cation via 
brain stimulation. These issues will be 
addressed as part of Module 3 of the Brain 
Waves project on neuroscience, confl ict 
and security.
Psychoactive chemicals: Pharmaceuticals 
to improve the performance or motivation 
of one’s own military have a long history 
(from hashish to marijuana and 
amphetamine) and widespread use. For 
example during recent confl icts it is 
reported that US pilots were supplied with 
Modafi nil to improve alertness and 
concentration during long fl ights (see also 
Section 2.2).
The use of any toxic chemical, including 
neuroactive chemicals such as nerve 
gasses, as weapons of warfare is 
prohibited in international law by the 
Chemical Weapons Convention. However, 
the Convention allows for the use of long-
standing ‘riot control agents’—‘tear 
gasses’ such CN and CS that cause local 
irritation of skin and mucous membranes— 
for ‘law enforcement including domestic 
riot control’. It is into this grey area 
between ‘police’ and ‘military’ deployment 
that some countries have sought to 
introduce incapacitating chemical 
weapons with central affects on the brain 
to induce unconsciousness or sedation. 
The fi rst use of incapacitating chemical 
weapons was in Moscow in 2002 when 
Russian Special Forces stormed a theatre 
to release hostages taken by Chechen 
militants. A derivative of the opioid 
fentanyl was pumped into the theatre with 
the intention of incapacitating the militants 
before the troops stormed the building— 
but the drug killed over 120 of the 
hostages (Davison 2009). Concerns have 
been raised of the risk such weapons’ 
development poses to the international 
ban on chemical weapons (see also 
Section 2.2).
Physical methods: Other basic research 
efforts aim to investigate the potential for 
affecting the brain and central nervous 
system using different powers, 
frequencies, and pulses of electromagnetic 
radiation. These would join emerging 
directed energy weapons, including lasers 
and the so called ‘Active Denial System’, a 
new weapon that projects a millimetre 
wave beam of radiation to heat the skin 
with the aim of causing a burning 
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sensation without permanent damage 
(Davison 2009). This weapon has recently 
been installed on trial in a Los Angeles 
prison. Whether one judges the availability 
of such techniques as a benefi t or a risk 
depends on whether one sees them as 
preventing unwanted social disorder or 
increasing the power of a militarised State 
to control citizens.
Of more direct military signifi cance has 
been the research conducted over several 
decades under DARPA contracts to 
develop ‘distance’ methods to control or 
manipulate brain and thought processes, 
in the past by high intensity microwave 
beams and more recently by magnetic 
pulses through TMS (Rose 2006). Despite 
the claims by some groups in the US that 
they have been unwittingly subject to such 
experiments by the military, the evidence is 
that at present the available technology 
requires that the individual be placed 
directly into the appropriate equipment. 
Thought control at a distance remains in 
the realm of science fi ction.
Conclusion
Many of both the benefi ts and the risks of 
advances in neuroscience still lie in the 
future. Some we can anticipate, others will 
be unintended or unforeseen. Much 
neuroscience is still ‘upstream’ of 
application. However the time to consider 
and make choices about the directions in 
which neuroscience could or should be 
pursued is now, whilst policy makers and 
society at large still have time to consider 
the potential developments and how, and 
to what extent, they may be directed or 
controlled (see also Section 3.4). The 
further ‘downstream’ the technologies 
have moved, the harder such choices 
will be.
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3.3 Neuroethics
Dr Sarah Chan and Professor John Harris, University of Manchester
Background
‘Neuroethics’ is a term that has gained 
prominence over the last decade to 
describe ethical issues arising in relation to 
various advances in neuroscience (Dana 
Centre 2002; Illes and Raffi n 2002; Farah 
2005). The kinds of technologies that 
provoke neuroethical concerns include 
neuroimaging techniques such as 
functional magnetic resonance imaging 
(fMRI) (see Section 2.1), the use of 
pharmacological agents to alter brain 
function (see Section 2.2), neurosurgery 
and other physical interventions (see 
Section 2.3). In addition, basic research in 
neuroscience continues to expand our 
knowledge of the biological basis for the 
brain’s functioning and for the mental, 
psychological and behavioural correlates 
of neurobiological phenomena (see also 
Sections 2.4 and 2.5). This raises further 
ethical and philosophical challenges as to 
the implications of these fi ndings and how 
they should be interpreted and used.
As with many new areas of technology 
and the sub-fi elds of ethics that have 
developed in association with them, the 
emergence of neuroethics as a specifi c 
area poses the question: are the associated 
ethical issues novel and distinct from 
general ethical concerns raised in the 
context of medicine, health care and 
biotechnology?
Some of the issues related to neuroethics 
are common across many areas of 
biomedical technology: for example, 
questions relating to participation in 
neuroscience research, or concerns 
regarding risk in relation to experimental 
technologies. Aside from these, however, 
neuroscience does challenge us to 
contemplate the brain and its relationship 
to the mind in new ways. Our increasing 
understanding of brain function as a 
biological phenomenon leads us to 
reconsider profound philosophical 
questions about free will, responsibility, 
identity, and the nature of consciousness. 
Although the questions themselves may 
be age-old, neuroscience both encourages 
us to revisit them and casts them in a new 
light—though not necessarily one that 
illuminates the answers any further (see 
Section 2.4 and Box 5).
Additionally, neuroscience is likely to have 
far-reaching social implications. The way in 
which we constitute ourselves and other 
persons as ‘neurological subjects’ 
(Cunningham-Burley 2010) inevitably 
affects our understandings of ourselves 
and our relationships with others. For 
example, clinical and social attitudes 
towards mental illness have evolved 
considerably over the last century, 
infl uenced by our changing understanding 
of the neuroscientifi c aspects of 
psychiatric conditions and the consequent 
perception of mental disorders as rooted in 
physical pathology (see also Section 3.2).
There are also diffi cult and in some cases 
urgent questions about how we ought to 
make use of the knowledge and the 
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technologies emerging from this fi eld, in 
contexts ranging from health care to the 
legal process and even political or social 
control (see Sections 2.4, 3.1, and 3.2).
The ethical concerns and social changes 
engendered by neuroscience and all it 
entails will require extensive consideration 
with respect to policy and regulation: how 
are we to manage and respond to these 
concerns and changes? How can and 
should we guide the uses of neuroscience 
in the public interest?
This essay presents a brief overview of the 
issues at the forefront of neuroethics as it 
has developed to date and highlights some 
that require further attention and others 
that may emerge in the near future. Lastly 
this essay will identify some current 
priorities for policy consideration and 
suggest an approach to ethical policy-
making in neuroethics.
Neuroimaging
Neuroimaging technologies such as 
positron emission tomography (PET) and 
fMRI enable us, in a manner of speaking, 
to ‘see’ mental processes in terms of the 
architecture and activity of the brain. (See 
Section 2.1) This has certainly increased 
scientifi c knowledge of the brain as a 
biological organ but does not fully answer 
philosophical and human or personal 
questions about conscious thought and 
the nature of mind. For example, we now 
have a scientifi c understanding of the 
neurological processes involved in moral 
reasoning and can observe some of the 
biological correlates of the mental 
phenomenon of consciousness—but will 
this produce a deeper philosophical or 
legal understanding of what it is to be 
conscious, or a moral agent? (See also 
Section 2.4.)
Whether or not this is the case, 
neuroimaging does have some ethical 
consequences in its application, including 
ramifi cations for diverse areas of medical 
ethics. For example, in relation to end of 
life decisions: recent research shows that 
patients previously thought to be in a 
permanent vegetative state actually 
demonstrate some level of brain function 
suffi cient to express (and therefore 
presumably to have) preferences. This 
result provoked intense debate over 
whether treatment protocols for such 
patients should be revised to take 
account of their newly-discovered capacity 
for some level of thought or at least 
reaction.
Privacy concerns
Foremost amongst the concerns raised 
about neuroimaging technologies is the 
fear that the use of neuroimaging to ‘read 
minds’ may lead to unacceptable 
infringements of personal privacy and civil 
liberty. At present, given the primitive state 
of the technology, such concerns are 
probably overblown. Neuroimaging, 
although it may be able to detect general 
mental states such as emotion and even, 
at a rudimentary level, more specifi c 
conceptual/thought patterns, currently it 
cannot be used to determine precisely the 
content of thoughts. Insofar as it can 
currently be interpreted to form general 
conclusions about individuals or 
tendencies within a population, it is little 
different to other physical indicators of 
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mood or mental state (see also Sections 
2.1 and 3.1).
Forensic uses
Of more concern is the danger that the 
possibilities currently offered by 
neuroimaging may be misinterpreted and 
thus misapplied, overstretching the current 
capabilities of the technology and leading 
to false assumptions being made about 
the extent to which brain states may 
constitute ‘windows on the mind’. This is 
particularly worrying in the forensic 
context, for example neuroimaging lie 
detectors (see Section 2.1 and Box 1). An 
attitude of scientifi c reductionism to 
forensic uses of neuroscience might lead 
to a one-dimensional legal approach which 
would be less likely to serve the 
requirements of justice or due process. 
Overly scientistic approaches to subjective 
fact-fi nding disregard the many complex 
factors that feed into legal and judicial 
decision-making. A rigorous and 
contextualised understanding of 
neuroscience and its place within social 
structures such as the law is required to 
avoid such pitfalls. This topic will be 
addressed as part of Module 4 of the Brain 
Waves project on neuroscience, 
responsibility and the law.
This is one area for the cautionary shaping 
of policy, both regarding direct uses and to 
help develop understanding on the part of 
publics and policy-makers. Scientists too 
have an important role to play in this 
process, through communication but 
without exaggeration and with a realistic 
attitude towards what is possible currently 
and in the near future.
Genetic neuroscience
Those seeking to map and explore the novel 
territory of neuroethics have often made 
reference to the genomics era and the 
congruent evolution of genethics to address 
ethical and social implications of genetic 
science as a paradigm for the development 
of neuroscience and neuroethics. As well as 
clear parallels between the two, there are 
degrees of overlap: the intersection of 
genetics with neuroscience, for example in 
behavioural genetics, multiplies the possible 
ethical dilemmas.
Already in a number of instances, 
behavioural genetics has raised novel 
issues: the correlation of particular sets of 
chromosomes with aggressive personality 
types has led to at least one legal attempt 
at a ‘genetic defence’ (Farahany and 
Burnet 2006) for criminal behaviour, while 
the discovery of specifi c genes thought to 
be associated with risk-taking and 
aggression, in connection with racial 
genotyping, may reinforce unwarranted 
and unwanted social attitudes towards 
certain racial groups (Wensley and King 
2008) (See also Section 3.2).
New medical applications
Probably the biggest area of medical 
application in neuroscience has been the 
development of psychopharmacological 
agents to alter various aspects of brain 
function (see Section 2.2 and 3.1). 
Psychoactive drugs such as 
antidepressants are becoming 
increasingly widely used; many drugs 
provide effective relief for conditions 
which previously represented serious 
impairments.
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Electrochemical or physical interventions 
may also have therapeutic effects: for 
example, deep brain stimulation to treat 
diseases such as Parkinson’s has been 
highly successful in a number of cases 
(see Box 4). Neurosurgery may alter brain 
function as a side-effect of removing 
harmful growths such as tumours, or may 
aim to achieve alterations in function 
through physical intervention.
Other possibilities include neural interfaces 
to enable humans (or indeed other 
animals) to control electronic or robotic 
devices—something that has immense 
possibility in terms of prosthetic 
applications (see Section 2.3 and Box 3). 
Yet these developments also lead us to 
question the biological nature of the 
human body and, perhaps, to redefi ne 
what we consider to be human. When 
machines are as much a part of ‘us’ as our 
own bodies the boundary between the 
biological and mechanical becomes 
blurred. And when we consider the extent 
to which we already depend on machines 
for our everyday existence—computers, 
electronic devices, modes of transport—it 
becomes apparent that perhaps the 
modern human is already part-machine.
Harmful uses
These promised new technologies also 
have potential downsides (see also Section 
3.2). Some have speculated that 
psychopharmacology may be used in a 
harmful way to achieve mind control or 
manipulation of minds to suit some ulterior 
motive. (Drugs are not the only 
possibility—it might argued that 
advertising and the psychological research 
that enables commercial operators to sell 
products more effectively is also a form of 
mind manipulation.) Another worry is that 
knowledge of neuroscience may be used 
to create new incapacitating chemical 
agents—a form of neurochemical warfare 
(see Sections 2.2 and 3.2). These issues 
will be addressed in Module 3 of the Brain 
Waves project on neuroscience, confl ict 
and security.
The dilemma in relation to many of these 
neuroscience applications, as with many 
new scientifi c advances, is that the 
selfsame technologies or knowledge used 
for the benefi cial medical treatments 
described might also be used for harmful 
purposes. How we should deal with the 
so-called ‘dual use’ problem is one of the 
serious issues facing not just neuroethics 
but science ethics as a whole (see also 
Section 3.4).
Medicalising the mind
There is one concern over dual-use 
technologies that we would argue is 
misdirected: not just their alternative or 
‘dual’ use to cause harm, but their use to 
cause too much good—in other words, to 
enhance as well as to cure. Neuro-
enhancement carries its own set of 
cautions to be considered, as will be 
discussed—however, simply doing more 
good should not in itself be a problem.
The perception that enhancement is wrong 
while treatment is right relates to another, 
more subtle but more signifi cant 
consequence of neuroscience: the 
medicalisation of the mind (see also 
Section 3.2). The scientifi c defi nition of a 
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biomedical model of the ‘healthy’ brain 
and by extension the ‘healthy’ mind is 
constructed in opposition to mental illness 
and psychiatric disorder, where health and 
normality are the binary opposite of 
disease and dysfunction.
This characterisation of certain conditions 
as abnormal or pathological affects our 
perception of self and of others. It may be 
stigmatising to be classed as mentally ill; 
the translation of neuroscience into 
diagnostic psychiatry criteria, and the 
effect this may have on people must take 
account of the possibility of harmful 
effects on those who are diagnosed. On 
the other hand, the understanding of 
mental illness in terms of physical 
pathology might reduce feelings of 
personal responsibility and attribution of 
blame for what can then be interpreted as 
an unfortunate accident of biology rather 
than purely mental and a fl aw intrinsic to 
the self. Receiving a neuroscientifi c 
diagnosis may be something of a relief, not 
only because it affords what appears to be 
concrete and hence a feeling of control, 
but because it allows separation of the ill/
diseased state of the body part ‘at fault’, 
and the negative values associated with 
this state, from the self.
Medicine and its conception of health 
provides a tremendous normative force 
that is often seen as stipulating the proper 
and improper uses of technologies 
(Fukuyama 2002; Habermas 2003). 
However, there is the danger that ascribing 
excessive normative weight to a medically-
determined concept of health risks 
removing the power of individuals to 
evaluate their own condition and make 
decisions about it for themselves. This is 
perhaps of particular concern with respect 
to mental health and neuroscience. The 
construction of medical norms for mental 
and psychological attributes may be seen 
to exclude and devalue the abnormal, 
thereby dictating what constitutes an 
‘acceptable’ way to think and to be.
There is also a further concern related to 
the development of new therapies. The 
normativity of medicine provides 
legitimation for those interventions 
designated as ‘medical therapies’, aimed 
at curing ‘disease’. But this phenomenon 
may be capitalised upon in reverse: by 
redefi ning the state of disease, an apparent 
moral need, not to mention a market, is 
created for new therapies. Some have 
speculated that the rise in availability and 
range of psychoactive drugs is due at best 
to overdiagnosis or a broadening of 
diagnostic categories, and at worst to the 
creation of new diseases to encourage 
uptake of new marketable products (see 
Section 3.2).
Neuro-enhancement
Perhaps the question we ought to ask 
about all neurotechnologies is not whether 
they constitute a medical therapy for a 
recognised dysfunction or disease, but 
whether in and of themselves they have 
some benefi cial effect, regardless of how 
we classify them. It is certainly true that 
many of the new treatments available have 
huge potential to improve function—and 
yet they have often been criticised for 
precisely that: for being ‘enhancements’ 
rather than ‘treatments’.
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Cognitive enhancement
Cognitive enhancement is one of the 
oldest forms of human enhancement and 
one of the most valued. Improving 
cognitive powers and capacities is one of 
the quintessential human activities: tool-
using, social organization, speech, written 
language, and more recently universal 
formal education and the use of 
computers, are all dramatic enhancers of 
cognition and knowledge acquisition. 
Chemical cognitive enhancers (see also 
Section 2.2 and Box 2) may now provide 
us with another means by which to seek 
the same end (Chan and Harris 2006; 
Greely et al. 2008; Foresight Mental Capital 
and Wellbeing Project 2008). While many 
are rightly concerned that our powers 
might outstrip our ability or willingness to 
control their harmful effects, the paradox 
will remain that cognitive enhancement is 
also the most promising option we have to 
prevent or remedy potential harms caused 
(Rees 2004; Perrson and Savulescu 2008; 
Harris 2011).
Mood enhancement
Many of the psychoactive drugs available 
today in the medical context and the 
recreational context—or sometimes 
both—are what might be termed ‘mood 
enhancers’ (see Section 2.2). This could 
mean that they enhance mood either in the 
sense of heightening whatever emotions 
the user is experiencing, or in the sense of 
improving mood towards some ‘better’ 
state however this may be defi ned: by 
personal preference, by medical 
normativity or by moral philosophy, 
among others.
Along with these drugs come fears that we 
will become a population of lotus-eaters 
constantly bathed in a sea of drug-induced 
euphoria and contentment, and concerns 
about authenticity of emotion and 
experience, once we can control our 
emotions and the way in which we react to 
experience through the application of 
suitable chemical modifi ers (see also 
Section 3.2). It might even be argued that 
there is something inherently wrong in 
seeking to alleviate distress and negative 
emotions through artifi cial means, that we 
as humans have a need for suffering This 
argument, though, is in many ways 
analogous to arguments about hard work 
as a virtue in other areas of enhancement 
(Kass 2003), and is susceptible to the same 
criticisms (Harris 2007).
Moral enhancement?
One topic that has received recent 
attention is the possibility of moral 
enhancement: that alongside the other 
mental and psychological capacities we 
might improve upon, it may also be 
possible to ‘make us better people’ in 
another sense, through enhancing our 
ability to act in a moral way. This idea 
seems plausible and perhaps appealing at 
fi rst glance: morality in the sense of 
‘goodness’ is perceived as a desirable 
quality and something for which we 
should strive. As science begins to 
examine the biological foundations of 
morality, for example through identifying 
regions of the brain that appear to be 
involved in moral decision-making or 
exploring the evolutionary origins of moral 
behaviour, it is tempting to think that 
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morality is something that can be easily 
identifi ed, isolated and improved. Along 
these lines, some have argued not only 
that enhancement is a moral imperative 
but that the greatest imperative is toward 
moral enhancement (Perrson and 
Savulescu 2008).
Upon closer examination, however, this 
apparently simple proposition is highly 
problematic. Ethical expertise1 is not being 
better at being good, rather it is being 
better at knowing the good and 
understanding what is likely to conduce to 
the good. Those with the insight, 
sympathy, empathy and knowledge to 
have formed clear ideas of what might 
conduce to the good are not necessarily 
better at making the world a better place, 
for a number of familiar reasons.
Some of these are to do with the problem 
of ‘akrasia’ or weakness of will, one form 
of which was brilliantly summarised by 
George Bernard Shaw when he defi ned 
virtue as ‘insuffi cient temptation’. A bigger 
problem is that the sorts of traits or 
dispositions that seem to lead to bad 
conduct are also the very same ones 
required not only for virtue but for any sort 
of moral life at all.
This problem was effectively articulated by 
Peter Strawson in a famous essay entitled 
‘Freedom and Resentment’ (Strawson 
1960). Strawson was concerned not with 
moral enhancement but with the problem 
of free will; in the course of combating 
some absurd forms of determinism he 
1 In this section we follow lines taken by John Harris 
in the introduction to his Enhancing Evolution 
Princeton University Press, Princeton and Oxford 
Paperback Edition 2010.
points out that certain strong emotions, 
including aversions, are an essential and 
even desirable part of certain valuable 
motives or attitudes to others. Could we in 
short have the sorts of feelings that are 
appropriate and possibly necessary to 
morality if we did not feel strong aversion, 
for example to someone who deliberately 
and unjustifi ably injured those we love?
The space between knowing the good and 
doing the good is a region entirely 
inhabited by freedom. Without the 
freedom, good cannot be a choice and if 
freedom disappears along with it goes 
virtue.
Machine minds?
One group of technologies that are not 
always considered within the scope of 
neuroethics, but perhaps should be, is 
computer science and especially artifi cial 
intelligence (AI). The modern idea of 
artifi cial, machine-based intelligence has 
been around for over 50 years, and as 
machines become ever more capable, the 
possibility of creating a computer that can 
‘think for itself’ seems increasingly 
plausible.
Efforts to create AI have produced so-
called AI computers that can solve intricate 
mathematical problems, perform complex 
search operations and, famously, play 
chess. There is as yet no evidence that any 
of these think in the way ordinary humans 
do, but it is undeniable that AI is becoming 
increasingly sophisticated and perhaps one 
day they will.
Another related area of research is 
computer-based brain simulation. Simple 
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modelling of neurobiological systems is 
already possible and plans to create a 
simulation of the entire brain are in 
progress. The question is whether a 
computer that simulates the whole human 
brain to a suffi ciently realistic degree 
would become, in some sense, a human 
mind or indeed any other sort of mind. We 
might be reluctant to give a ‘human’ label 
to a non-biological entity lacking any of the 
physical attributes by which we normally 
identify humans; yet if it were able to think 
like us, ought we not to recognise it as one 
of us? This harks back also to the 
philosophy of mind problems outlined 
above: would a computer that simulated 
the physical workings of a brain also be 
thus a mind, though not housed in a 
human body?
When would we say that a computer had 
become conscious? How would we know, 
and what would or should we do about it? 
The issues we face with AI refl ect those 
raised by neuroethics with respect to our 
own brains and minds: how do we 
quantify consciousness, and what is its 
moral signifi cance?
Policy concerns in neuroethics
There are a number of pressing policy 
concerns in neuroethics today. Perhaps the 
foremost relates to the increasing 
commercialisation, not just of 
neuroscience but of science in general. In 
relation to neuroscience and to other 
technologies, we need to be aware of the 
effect that proprietary intellectual property 
rights has on the entire process of 
scientifi c discovery as well as access to the 
fruits of this process (The Manchester 
Manifesto 2009). Not only has it been 
shown that current mechanisms for 
proprietising innovation may have adverse 
consequences for the progress of science 
through restricting the openness with 
which scientists feel they can 
communicate about their research (Royal 
Society 2003), but commercialisation, 
through altering the balance of incentives 
for innovation, may actually change the 
course of science itself—not necessarily 
for the better (Chan, Sulston and Harris 
forthcoming).
Another issue is how we ought in general 
to regulate the use of emerging 
technologies (see Section 3.4). While risk 
and safety are quite rightly the foremost 
concerns in relation to introducing new 
biomedical technologies, it does not follow 
that the rational approach to managing risk 
is to limit their use only to circumstances 
where the likely benefi t is so vast as to 
justify unequivocally the fuzzy, unquantifi ed 
risk that we fear. If benefi ts of whatever 
sort are possible, they perhaps should—
and undoubtedly will—be sought after. To 
take again the example of chemical 
cognitive enhancers, if it proves that 
‘healthy’ adults can benefi t from these, we 
should be pro-active about assessing risk in 
these circumstances rather than hiding 
behind over-restrictive regulation (see also 
Section 2.2 and Box 2).
As discussed, the issues encompassed 
within neuroethics range from largely 
theoretical philosophical questions to 
immediate practical concerns regarding 
possible improper uses of present 
technology. While the latter self-evidently 
require addressing, it is important to 
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remember that the role of ethics 
particularly relating to policy and regulation 
is not simply reactive and restrictive but 
should be forward-thinking and facilitative 
where needed. The aim of science ethics 
should be to ensure that science is done 
as best it can be and also does the best it 
can, to improve lives and increase the 
welfare of persons. This will be achieved 
not merely through preventing misuses, 
but by guiding the direction and 
application of science to bring about 
benefi cial outcomes as well as avert 
harmful ones.
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Over past decades, global debates over the 
nature, pace and direction of research and 
innovation have yielded important lessons 
concerning the governance of new 
technologies. We can identify three broad 
lessons and seven more specifi c 
‘syndromes’. From these, we can extract 
three principles for the ‘social appraisal’ of 
neuroscience and neurotechnology. The 
lessons of past technologies are all the 
more clear and emphatic for being hard-
won in protracted high-stakes 
controversies, like those over nuclear 
power, hazardous chemicals, and GM 
foods. Yet received wisdoms, prevailing 
values and incumbent interests can 
obscure many key features of these 
lessons. The challenge is compounded 
because some details may be ambiguous, 
with different contexts and interpretations 
suggesting contrasting policy implications. 
As a result, there are dangers that some 
familiar but readily-avoided mistakes may 
be repeated in the fi eld of neuroscience 
and technology. If society is to maximise 
prospects for realising the many positive 
potentials in this area—and minimising 
risks—then it is crucial that these lessons 
be heeded (EEA 2001; Voß et al. 2006).
Three lessons
Lesson one
One lesson is taught by cumulative 
experiences in areas like agriculture, 
energy, medical and material science: 
Levels of knowledge that are suffi cient for 
a technology to meet initial narrow 
practical goals, are rarely suffi cient to 
predict the full range of eventual indirect 
impacts.
Initial visions for many technologies 
entirely failed to appreciate wider 
consequences, both benefi cial and 
adverse. On the positive side, for example, 
are wireless broadcasting, 
semiconductors, lasers or the World Wide 
Web. More negatively, there are examples 
like asbestos, various chemicals (eg DDT, 
PCBs, TBT, and CFCs), thalidomide and 
retail use of ionising radiation. In all these 
cases, narrow initially-prioritised benefi ts 
are now generally held to be signifi cantly 
outweighed by unforeseen and unintended 
negative impacts. A vast array of other 
examples occupy intermediate positions in 
this spectrum like the urban automobile, 
nuclear power, industrial agrochemicals, 
and genetically modifi ed crops. In each of 
these areas there is active debate over 
their complex, pervasive, and intertwined 
benefi ts and impacts (ESTO 1999; EEA 
2001; Stirling 2009).
For good or ill, several of what turned out 
to be the most signifi cant side effects of 
many new technologies lay well beyond 
the bounds of initial quantifi cation (or even 
imagination). Indeed, conventional 
regulatory efforts at anticipation and prior 
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appraisal were in many cases so 
circumscribed and rudimentary that a 
realistic range of implications was typically 
fi nally appreciated only by learning through 
actual pursuit of the technologies 
themselves in the real world. A resulting 
dilemma is that awareness of our ignorance 
may actually increase with growing 
knowledge and experience. Here, it is a 
particular feature of neuroscience that—
irrespective of its possible applications—an 
increase in such knowledge may in itself be 
hazardous (see Section 3.2).
Neuroscience challenges many deeply 
held convictions around the nature of ‘free 
will’ (see Sections 2.4, 3.3 and Box 5). The 
more we think we understand human 
agency, the more diffi cult it becomes to 
sustain the necessary fi ctions around its 
exercise. As science is translated into 
technology, an expanding array of 
economic, institutional and political 
commitments compounds exposures to 
the consequences of ignorance. Incentives 
grow to interpret ‘absence of evidence’ as 
‘evidence of absence’ of harm—leaving us 
systematically more vulnerable. This places 
a high premium on provision for early and 
thorough ‘social appraisal’ of the potential 
applications and implications of 
neuroscience. Rather than seeking to avoid 
political debate, we should fi nd ways to 
make this as rigorous, comprehensive and 
critical as possible (Wynne 1992; EGSG 
2007; Leach et al. 2010).
Lesson two
A second lesson is that: Enthusiastic and 
highly visible championing of some specifi c 
new family of technologies by the most 
infl uential scientifi c and powerful industry 
or government bodies, provides no 
guarantee that these technologies will 
actually come to be established in the 
envisaged forms.
A classic example of this is provided by the 
case of nuclear power. This is not a 
partisan point. Despite current renewed 
interest, there remain serious questions 
over the relative scale of the future 
promise of nuclear power when compared 
with alternative low-carbon energy 
options. Yet in the thirty years after the 
Second World War, nuclear power was 
almost universally expected in mainstream 
scientifi c, industry and government circles 
to present a complete and ubiquitous 
energy source from the 1990s onwards. 
From famous early prognoses that nuclear 
electricity would be ‘too cheap to meter’, 
confi dent predictions of exponential global 
growth rates for this technology were 
persistently made by supposedly neutral 
and authoritative scientifi c bodies right up 
until the 1980s—long after the actual pace 
of development was stalled and moving 
into reverse. In reality, construction rates 
for new global nuclear capacity dipped 
almost to zero in the 1990s and presently 
remain signifi cantly smaller than that of 
wind power—with the discrepancy tending 
to increase (Wiliams and Edge 1996; Leach 
et al. 2010).
Experience with nuclear power is 
recounted here, because the passage of 
time has allowed some sense of 
perspective. In fi elds like neuroscience, 
there has accumulated insuffi cient 
experience to determine the validity of 
some of the more ambitious aspirations 
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and claims. Already, however, there are 
grounds for caution concerning the ‘over-
hyping’ of certain possible neuroscience 
applications. It has become clear, for 
instance, that benefi ts of genetic testing 
must be qualifi ed by recognising the 
signifi cance of associated risks (no matter 
how small) of false diagnosis. Likewise, 
hopes for a transformative new generation 
of drugs to treat depression have thus far 
turned out to be unfulfi lled (see also 
Section 3.2). In the same way that early 
expected trends in uptake of GM foods in 
Europe can now be seen to have been 
destined for frustration, so these tentative 
experiences suggest grounds for caution 
over exaggerated claims and aspirations.
Elsewhere in the life sciences—for 
example with monoclonal antibodies and 
genome sequencing—we have become 
quite familiar with the dynamics of ‘hype 
cycles’ generated by privileged parochial 
interests. This points to the ever-present 
possibility that even the most authoritative 
expectations for any given application of 
neuroscience will fail to be fully realised—
at least on initially stated timescales. 
Again, this presents an imperative for 
deeper, more comprehensive and critical 
social appraisal and political debate (Voß 
et al. 2006; SPRU 2009).
Lesson three
A third—even more crucial—lesson is that: 
The particular paths followed by scientifi c and 
technological developments in any given area 
are not pre-determined by nature.
This insight does not deny that physical 
reality and technical feasibility impose 
highly demanding constraints on what is 
possible in the real world. Nor does it 
diminish the essential role of science in 
opening up and driving forward many new 
possibilities. The point is that the particular 
directions taken by innovation in a fi eld like 
neuroscience are powerfully shaped by 
social, as well as material, factors. This is 
true even of long-established consumer 
products like the QWERTY keyboard or 
VHS videos. Even in highly competitive 
markets, these technologies came to 
global domination, despite being widely 
seen as inferior to possible (even existing) 
alternatives. The same is true of 
infrastructures like narrow (rather than 
broad) gauge railways, AC (rather than DC) 
or centralised (rather than distributed) 
electricity supply, submarine-derived 
civilian nuclear power reactors, early 
petrol-driven internal combustion engines 
(compared to contemporary steam and 
electric technologies, which might feasibly 
have been advanced to similar effect) and 
current general urban dependency on the 
automobile (Williams and Edge 1996; 
EGSG 2007; SPRU 2009).
Each of these cases demonstrate how 
economic and political power structures, 
property rights, income distributions, 
dominant values, and incumbent market 
interests can help ‘lock in’ certain 
innovation pathways and ‘crowd out’ 
others. Resource constraints, path 
dependencies, learning effects and scale 
economies in a fi nite world, all mean that 
our global society cannot equally realise 
the full potential of all feasible and viable 
innovation trajectories. Whether 
deliberately or blindly, societies choose 
which paths to follow or not. Looking 
forward, we see examples in choices 
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between particular low carbon energy or 
sustainable agriculture pathways. Likewise 
within neuroscience—and between 
neuroscience and alternative applications—
those innovation pathways that we end up 
pursuing will typically represent only a 
small subset of those that were initially 
potentially viable. Which direction we go in 
depends as much on political as on 
technical choices. This is why social 
appraisal of neuroscience research and the 
regulation of associated technologies 
should pay as much attention to driving 
intentions and goals and associated power 
structures as to claimed benefi ts and 
supposed risks. Are these for military or 
civilian ends; northern or southern 
markets; public or private applications; IP-
intensive or open-source development? 
(SPRU 2009; Leach et al. 2010).
Seven syndromes
From these three lessons, there emerges a 
series of seven more specifi c ‘syndromes’ 
to look out for in the governance of 
neuroscience and technology. These 
interact, but each may be distinguished in 
its specifi c causes, symptoms or 
remedies. For ease of recall, each is 
labelled below with a simple phrase. An 
appreciation of these interweaving 
dynamics in knowledge, technology and 
encompassing society is essential to any 
robust design for associated governance 
intervention (Leach et al. 2010).
Foregone Futures
Global society as a whole may fail to fulfi l 
the benefi ts of some particular set of 
possibilities for innovation, by pursuing 
instead alternative trajectories that later 
leave these practically unrealisable. For 
instance, this is widely seen as true of 
locked-in global water supply 
infrastructures—which militate against 
more effi cient and environmentally 
benefi cial institutions and practices. 
Likewise, neuroscientifi c interventions in 
areas like attention defi cit hyperactivity 
disorder (ADHD), cognitive enhancement, 
or brain interference may foreclose 
possibilities of alternative institutional or 
behavioural provision (see also Section 
3.2). Here as elsewhere, it could emerge 
that potentially preferable ‘open source’ 
policies or practices are eclipsed by greater 
enthusiasm of existing research and 
innovation systems for IP-intensive 
neuroscience-specifi c applications 
(EGSG 2007).
Missed opportunities
A particular economy may fail to gain 
desired leadership in a successfully 
anticipated developmental direction, with 
benefi ts accruing instead to competitors 
making different choices at earlier stages. 
There are many historic examples of this, 
including what are conceded on all sides 
to have been misconceived British choices 
in the 1960s of nuclear reactor design. 
Again, this is as true of different 
applications within the fi eld of 
neuroscience as of possible non-
neuroscience alternatives that a general 
prioritising of science-based approaches 
might obscure. For instance, there are 
queries whether the driving objectives of 
UK neuroscience research appropriately 
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balance preventive public health or 
individualised private health? (see also 
Section 3.2) Does a ‘preventive’ focus rest 
on practices that address entire 
populations (implying collective public 
provision) or proprietary products targeting 
specifi c sub-populations (implying more 
readily privately-appropriable revenues)? 
Either way, structural shifts in global 
markets may signifi cantly affect the 
prospects for differing patterns of 
neuroscience research (see also Section 
3.1). These may substantively affect 
competitiveness in presently undetermined 
ways (Williams and Edge 2006).
Forced tramlines
This is like ‘foregone futures’, but can play 
out globally or locally. In contrast to 
reduced competitiveness from historical or 
politically innocent decision-making, this 
syndrome is exacerbated by the deliberate 
exercise of power within research and 
innovation systems. Either way, economies 
may be forced by narrow incumbent 
interests incorrectly to anticipate and 
commit to a particular innovation 
trajectory, that turns out in actuality to be 
inferior to contrasting alternatives. An 
example is the early neglect by the 
centralised UK power generating system of 
large national renewable energy 
capabilities and resources. In similar ways, 
there are possibilities that current driving 
motivations behind neuroscience research 
(such as pursuing ‘rents’ on IP or 
enhanced military applications), may ‘lock 
in’ to certain research and innovation 
pathways. The greater the diffi dence 
displayed in research governance or 
regulatory appraisal, to explicitly examine 
power relations and vested interests within 
research and innovation systems, the 
greater the exposure to this syndrome 
(SPRU 2009).
Convenient blinkers
Choices among possible technological 
pathways may be further impeded or 
misguided by the contrived invisibility of 
unforeseen, or unintended, side effects. 
Conventional risk assessment focuses on a 
typically rather limited set of outcomes. 
These are circumscribed by the remits of 
regulatory institutions (eg on health rather 
than equity) and by what can be 
documented and quantifi ed in currently-
accredited evidence. These 
institutionalised blinkers may create further 
vulnerability to strategic manipulation of 
the kind occurring in ‘forced tramlines’. In 
this way, society may be presented with an 
unbalanced picture of the most attractive 
alternatives. By the time gaps or bias 
becomes evident, it may be too late easily 
to change course.
Examples of this syndrome may be seen 
retrospectively in persistent global 
dependencies on technologies like fossil 
fuels and carcinogenic and stratospheric 
ozone-depleting halogenated 
hydrocarbons. These short-sighted 
attitudes towards what are now 
acknowledged to be prohibitive health or 
environmental effects have thus 
contributed to systematic neglect of 
superior substitute technologies. In this 
way, there are dangers that neuroscience 
research in areas like incapacitating 
chemical weapons (see Sections 2.2 and 
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3.2) and other forms of manipulation or 
interference with brain function may yield 
side effects not only in direct use, but also 
in less visible indirect ways. Crucial here is 
that the mere existence (even positing) of 
some of these technologies may—even 
without tangible physical effects—exert 
certain kinds of indirect social impact. 
Falling outside the conventional scope of 
regulatory attention, there is currently no 
effective provision for the taking of 
responsibility for these kinds of wider 
implications (Wynne 1992).
Shared delusion
A particular technological pathway, 
despite being widely adopted, may still 
fail to achieve the expected (or promised) 
aims on any reasonable timescale. This 
may be entirely independent of 
countervailing pressures or competing 
innovations. It may be seen, for instance, 
in experience hitherto with nuclear 
fusion power. Here, the expected 
commercialisation horizon has remained 
at a steady three decades or so for the 
past fi fty years. Yet commitments are 
sustained on a roughly constant scale 
irrespective of this, over periods that see 
entire cycles in the rise and fall of other 
technologies. Where a signifi cant 
proportion of current investment in 
neuroscience rests on some of the more 
colourful ‘magic bullet’ claims made on 
behalf of applications in fi elds like 
cognitive enhancement (see Section 2.2 
and Box 2), national security or criminal 
justice (see Sections 3.2, 3.3 and Box 1), 
then it would be prudent to keep a wary 
eye open for prospects of this kind of 
syndrome (Leach et al. 2010).
See no evil
A particular technology may realise its 
initial promise, but this very feasibility may 
itself create opportunities for deliberate or 
inadvertent misuse. This raises the very 
simple and familiar challenge of 
contending (sometimes perverse) human 
intentions. Although readily foreseeable in 
the same terms as benign uses, malign 
applications are typically understated in 
regulatory assessment, sometimes for 
legal reasons. Yet easily anticipated effects 
may be of a magnitude that seriously 
jeopardises overall benefi ts. This is 
exemplifi ed by the paradox that military 
aims are at the same time so prominent 
and so under-scrutinised in global 
research. Roughly one third of worldwide 
human effort in research and innovation is 
devoted—directly or indirectly—to refi ning 
ways to perpetrate premeditated organised 
violence. Yet the prospect of violent 
intentions is often regarded as an irrelevant 
factor in appraisal of supposedly ‘neutral’ 
technologies. With an uncertain proportion 
of world neuroscience research directed 
towards military ends, the picture here is 
particularly obscure (see Section 3.2). 
However, this ‘see no evil’ syndrome has 
long been acute with ‘dual use’ 
technologies in the nuclear, biological, and 
chemical sector and is now frequently 
raised of transgenics and synthetic biology. 
Misuse even of ostensibly non-military 
applications of neuroscience may hold 
profound security implications, for instance 
in prospects of ‘remote brain imaging’, 
‘brain fi ngerprinting’ and ‘transcranial 
magnetic stimulation’ (Voß et al. 2006) (see 
Section 3.2 and Box 4) Some of these 
issues will be addressed as part of 
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Module 3 of the Brain Waves project on 
neurosience, confl ict and security.
Unwise aspirations
This syndrome raises a familiar and 
innocent human foible: wishful thinking. A 
particular technology may deliver on its 
professed aims, but these may themselves 
turn out to be questionable. For instance, it 
is precisely the success of visions of 
affordable autonomous individual mobility 
that have led to domination of the urban 
automobile and associated pollution and 
gridlock. Despite undoubted benefi ts of 
increased material affl uence, similar 
concerns are voiced about intensifi cation 
of ‘the consumer society’. Such issues 
may also arise in neuroscience. For 
instance, a companion section in this 
volume (see Section 3.2) asks whether 
enhanced memory faculties in old age are 
actually preferable to ‘benign neglect’? 
Private provision for expensive forms of 
cognitive enhancement may also seriously 
aggravate social inequalities (see also 
Sections 3.2 and 3.3). Such innovation 
pathways may be judged problematic not 
because of ‘side effects’, but in terms of 
the intended aims themselves. Concerns 
compound even if—especially if—these 
innovations turn out to be ‘successful’. 
In neuroscience and technology, as 
elsewhere, ‘we should be careful what 
we wish for’ (EGSG 2007).
Three principles
Taken together, these challenges for the 
governance of neuroscience and 
neurotechnology may seem dauntingly 
complex and intractable. Yet there does 
exist a well developed body of 
understanding and practice suggesting a 
series of practical policy responses. 
Although there are no panaceas, these 
may offer important ways systematically to 
maximise potential benefi ts and minimise 
adverse impacts. This is despite the fact 
that what constitutes a ‘benefi t’ or ‘impact’ 
may be uncertain or contested (ESTO 
1999; EEA 2001; EGSG 2007).
Perhaps the best way to express these 
responses is through three principles for 
‘social appraisal’ of neuroscience and 
neurotechnology: responsibility, 
precaution and engagement. These move 
beyond narrow, technical, 
compartmentalised notions of ‘risk 
analysis’, ‘regulatory assessment’ or 
‘ethical deliberation’. They allow ‘social 
appraisal’ to develop in ways that 
transcend entrenched institutional and 
cultural divides. In particular, they equally 
avoid the perils of cornucopian notions of 
‘foresight’ and apocalyptic ideas of 
‘precaution’. They help navigate a path 
between technocratic forms of ‘expert 
analysis’ and the more romantic 
aspirations to ‘public participation’. Going 
beyond organisational remits and formal 
procedures, these principles are shared 
responsibilities of a range of actors and 
practices—not just ‘regulators’ or 
‘decision makers’. Rather than sidelining 
critical politics, they actively promote 
more mature political debate. Taken 
together, they offer more rigorous and 
democratically accountable paths for the 
pursuit of neuroscience and 
neurotechnology (Voß et al. 2006).
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Responsibility
Governance of neuroscience and 
neurotechnology should be demonstrably 
independent from vested institutional, 
economic and political interests. These 
include academic disciplines, networks 
and institutes. Rather than treating 
appraisal as the exclusive preserve of 
specialist expertise (including ethics and 
social science), this requires open, 
proactive, accountable and transparently 
political oversight of innovation systems 
and regulatory structures. It should be 
recognised in various ways that 
developers, regulators, and scientists 
themselves are responsible and 
accountable for the indirect and 
‘unanticipated’ impacts of neuro-
innovations as well as their directly 
foreseeable effects. For instance, this may 
raise issues around the additive or 
synergistic effects of neuroscience 
applications in combination with other 
technologies, as well as possibilities for 
inadvertent or malign misuse.
Deliberation over such issues should take 
place at the earliest ‘upstream’ stages in 
innovation and policy processes, thus 
helping foster more benign pathways 
before ‘lock-in’ occurs. It should include 
account of industrial trends and cumulative 
behavior (as often missed in case-by-case 
regulation of individual applications). It 
should scrutinise the reversibility, ‘agility’ 
and ‘resilience’ of associated institutional 
or industrial commitments in the event of 
negative experience. The more reversible 
the commitments, the more relaxed might 
be the attitude to approval. Above all, such 
deliberation should explicitly refl ect on the 
implications of the exercise of power 
within research and innovation systems 
(Voß et al. 2006).
In research prioritization and funding, as 
well as innovation, development and 
regulation, measures should be enacted 
to avoid the undue privileging of 
neuroscience over other socially feasible 
and benefi cial applications. For instance, 
appraisal should explicitly and 
symmetrically compare an array of diverse 
alternative technology and policy options 
and potential substitutes for each 
neuroscience application. This should 
begin with prioritised societal needs, rather 
than favoured ‘solutions’ in search of 
applications. It should also afford 
comparable attention to organizational and 
behavioural innovations, as well as IP-
intensive scientifi c or technology-based 
options. Greater value might be placed on 
diversity in research and development 
portfolios, such as to provide a variety of 
complementary options for addressing 
each focal problem. This involves a 
premium on increased international 
collaboration and co-ordination in 
neuroscience research (EEA 2001; 
SPRU 2009).
Precaution
Rather than simply assuming claimed 
benefi ts, regulation of neuroscience and 
neurotechnology should require 
justifi cation of the social aims of 
neuroscience applications and their 
alternatives. This helps address otherwise 
opposing concerns, in that developers are 
concerned that regulation tends 
systematically to neglect the importance of 
benefi ts, while critics are concerned at 
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credulous acceptance that supplier 
advocacy equates with legitimate societal 
benefi t. In examining pros and cons, 
appraisal should go beyond probabilistic 
methods, to scrutinise a wider range of 
uncertainties, sensitivities and scenarios 
than is normal in risk assessment or cost-
benefi t analysis. It should deliberately 
search for ‘blind spots’, gaps in knowledge 
and divergent scientifi c views of a kind not 
conventionally publicised by expert 
advisory committees. In specialist 
deliberations as in public communications, 
it should be clearly emphasised that 
‘absence of evidence’ is not ‘evidence of 
absence’ of harm (ESTO 1999).
Where evidence is lacking, appraisal 
should attend to proxies of possible harm 
as well as manifest harm itself. For 
instance, rapid dissemination or eventual 
ubiquity of a neuroscience innovation are 
not in themselves hazardous, yet remain 
relevant to the scale of possible 
unforeseen harm. Rather than presuming 
‘proof’ to be singular or self-evident, 
appraisal should deliberate over levels of 
proof, who should bear the burden of 
persuasion and who should resource the 
gathering of evidence and conduct of 
analysis. It should openly acknowledge 
that such matters are intrinsically value-
based and therefore political in nature. 
Treating them more explicitly and distinctly, 
offers to improve both democratic and 
professional accountability.
Likewise, appraisal should avoid over-
reliance on glamorous theoretical 
modeling at the expense of scientifi cally 
less-rewarding (yet crucial) monitoring and 
surveillance. This also helps defuse the 
otherwise polarised ‘all-or-nothing’ political 
dynamics between unconditional approval 
of ‘safe’ innovations or irrevocable 
‘banning’ of questionable products. Where 
residual uncertainties remain over 
otherwise favourable innovations, then 
these may be addressed by deliberately-
designed provision for liability, 
responsibility or product stewardship 
(ESTO 1999; EEA 2001).
Engagement
Principles of responsibility and precaution 
should be implemented in research and 
innovation governance in a fashion that is 
subject to open, accessible and 
democratically-accountable public 
engagement. There exists a wide variety 
of methods, procedures, and institutions 
for facilitating this. Different approaches 
will be appropriate in contrasting contexts. 
But certain basic features span the 
differences. For instance, design and 
implementation of governance procedures 
should draw on relevant non-expert 
knowledge and experience as well as a 
diversity of specialist expertise. Depending 
on context, this requires regulation to go 
beyond the most immediately-implicated 
neuroscience disciplines to include 
patients, families, teachers, healthcare 
staff, consumers and local communities. 
Although specialists are often also all 
these things, their engagement specifi cally 
with neuroscience and technology issues 
is conditioned by their roles as 
specialists—involving interests and 
evaluative perspectives as well as 
technical knowledge. This is as true of 
social scientifi c and ethical expertise, as it 
is of the natural science and engineering 
specialisms (EGSG 2007; Stirling 2008).
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Particular attention should be paid to the 
interests and perspectives of ‘stakeholder 
groups’ who hold themselves to be 
possibly affected, whether or not these 
groups are formally organised or 
recognised. The point here is to engage 
with a diversity of relevant values and 
interests—including those of academic 
institutions, research networks and 
specialist disciplines. As has been 
demonstrated in regulatory experience like 
that with bovine spongiform 
encephalopathy (BSE), even apparently 
uninformed and spurious sensibilities like 
the ‘yuk factor’ can sometimes contain 
important intuitions. If considered in a 
measured fashion rather than rejected as 
irrational, such considerations can be 
indirectly informative, or serve to prompt 
valuable attention to otherwise neglected 
issues. The point here is not simply to 
foster ‘trust’, ‘credibility or ‘acceptance’, 
but substantively to infl uence the nature 
and direction of the scientifi c and 
technological pathways that are pursued.
To this end, public engagement means 
being as rigorous in asking questions in 
social appraisal of neuroscience, as in 
deriving the answers. It is only in this way 
that there can be confi dence over the 
institutional frameworks and procedures 
through which appraisal and governance 
are undertaken. Here, the point is not that 
public engagement delivers apparently 
simple prescriptive fi ndings to policy 
making—with the task of decision makers 
then reduced merely to accepting or 
rejecting. Depending on the context, the 
role of public engagement may lie more in 
‘opening up’ a diversity of possible 
choices, or in conveying to political 
decision makers a plurality of equally-
reasonable possible policies—each with 
their associated conditions for adoption. It 
is in this way that public engagement of all 
kinds can avoid itself becoming a 
‘technical fi x’—and inform and enrich 
(rather than subvert) democratic politics. 
Only through ‘plural and conditional’ 
signals to policy, may public engagement 
simultaneously support both scientifi c 
rigour and democratic accountability in the 
governance of neuroscience (Stirling 2008; 
Leach et al. 2010).
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